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Full-Text Articles in Business
Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong
Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with …
Tax Aggressiveness And Auditor Resignation, Yoonseok Zang, Beng Wee Goh, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin
Tax Aggressiveness And Auditor Resignation, Yoonseok Zang, Beng Wee Goh, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine the relation between client tax aggressiveness and auditor‟s resignation decision. Consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance which suggests that client tax aggressiveness can increase litigation and reputational risk to auditors and increase the potential conflict with managers, we find a positive association between our proxies for tax aggressiveness and the likelihood that an auditor resigns from an audit engagement. Further, this association is stronger when external monitoring of the client firm is less effective, when there is greater potential for agency problems in the client firm, and when the economic importance of the fees received from …
Tax Aggressiveness And Auditor Resignation, Yoonseok Zang, Beng Wee Goh, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin
Tax Aggressiveness And Auditor Resignation, Yoonseok Zang, Beng Wee Goh, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine the relation between client tax aggressiveness and auditor‟s resignation decision. Consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance which suggests that client tax aggressiveness can increase litigation and reputational risk to auditors and increase the potential conflict with managers, we find a positive association between our proxies for tax aggressiveness and the likelihood that an auditor resigns from an audit engagement. Further, this association is stronger when external monitoring of the client firm is less effective, when there is greater potential for agency problems in the client firm, and when the economic importance of the fees received from …