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Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Corporate Finance

Agency problems

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Business

Family Firm Research: A Review, Qiang Cheng Sep 2014

Family Firm Research: A Review, Qiang Cheng

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This article reviews family firm studies in the finance and accounting literature, primarily those conducted using data from the United States and China. Family owners have unique features such as concentrated ownership, long investment horizon, and reputation concerns. Given the distinguishing features of family ownership and control, family firms face unique agency conflicts. We discuss the agency problems in family firms and review the findings of recent family firm studies. We call for more research to understand the unique family effects and encourage more research on Chinese family firms. Part I of the article discusses the fundaments of family firms: …


Family Ownership And Ceo Turnovers, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Zhonglan Dai Sep 2013

Family Ownership And Ceo Turnovers, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Zhonglan Dai

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by family members (i.e., family CEO firms) or non-family firms. These results are robust to alternative performance measures and CEO turnover definitions. Additional analyses indicate that higher family ownership leads to even higher (lower) turnover-performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms). These results indicate that, with regard to CEO turnover decisions, better monitoring of CEOs by family …


Are Us Family Firms Subject To Agency Problems? Evidence From Ceo Turnover And Firm Valuation, Xia Chen, Zhonglan Dai Sep 2007

Are Us Family Firms Subject To Agency Problems? Evidence From Ceo Turnover And Firm Valuation, Xia Chen, Zhonglan Dai

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper investigates the impact of the founding family's presence in US public firms on the extent of agency problems related to CEO turnover decisions and on firm valuations after poor performance. In particular, we focus on three types of US public firms: family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms (family firms managed by a hired CEO outside the founding family), and non-family firms. We hypothesize that, the agency problem arising from the expropriation of small shareholders by large shareholders in family CEO firms and the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control in non-family firms, lead …