Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Social networks

Corporate Finance

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Business

Political Connections And Firm Value: Evidence From The Regression Discontinuity Design Of Close Gubernatorial Elections, Quoc-Anh Do, Yen Teik Lee, Bang D. Nguyen Mar 2015

Political Connections And Firm Value: Evidence From The Regression Discontinuity Design Of Close Gubernatorial Elections, Quoc-Anh Do, Yen Teik Lee, Bang D. Nguyen

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political connections are more valuable for firms connected to winning challengers, for smaller and financially dependent firms, in more corrupt states, in states of connected firms’ headquarters and operations, and in closer, smaller, and active networks. Post-election, firms connected to the winner receive significantly more state procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser.


Social Networks And Risk Taking: Evidence From Corporate Control Activities, Yen Teik Lee Oct 2012

Social Networks And Risk Taking: Evidence From Corporate Control Activities, Yen Teik Lee

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper investigates the impact of social ties between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) andboard members on corporate risk-taking in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and on shareholdervalue. Using a measure of CEO-director connections in a large sample of U.S. firms from 2000 to2010, we document that boardroom connections lower firm acquisitiveness. If connected CEOsundertake M&As, they are less likely to choose focus acquisitions, and more likely to pay in stock.CEO-board connections do not enhance firm value in M&As. Higher levels of boardroomconnection are associated with lower announcement returns and lower subsequent return on assets.Our results are robust to alternative explanations …