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Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Corporate governance

2006

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Business

Strategic Investments In Japanese Corporations: Do Foreign Portfolio Owners Foster Underinvestment Or Appropriate Investment?, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Murali D. R. Chari, Abdul A. Rasheed Jun 2006

Strategic Investments In Japanese Corporations: Do Foreign Portfolio Owners Foster Underinvestment Or Appropriate Investment?, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Murali D. R. Chari, Abdul A. Rasheed

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper investigates the effect of foreign ownership on strategic investments in Japanese corporations. Foreign owners are typically portfolio investors who frequently buy and sell shares and hold diversified portfolios of small stakes in many firms. Prior research has presented two conflicting perspectives on the role of such investors: (a) their frequent trading leads to pressure for short-term returns that fosters underinvestment; (b) their active trading fosters appropriate investments. We investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and strategic investments using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 146 Japanese manufacturing firms from 1991 to 1997. We found that foreign …


Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding Feb 2006

Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In an emerging economy, the alternative to government control is often no governance. We investigate the governance structure of government-linked companies (GLCs) in Singapore under the ownership/control structure of Temasek Holdings, the government holding entity, which typically owns substantial cash flow rights but disproportional control rights and exercises no operational control. We compare the financial and market performance of GLCs with non-GLCs, where each has a different set of governance structure, the key difference being government ownership. We show that Singaporean GLCs have higher valuations and better corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs. The results hold even when …