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Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

China

Corporate Finance

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Full-Text Articles in Business

Growing Up Under Mao And Deng: On The Ideological Determinants Of Corporate Policies, Hao Liang, Rong Wang, Haikun Zhu Jun 2023

Growing Up Under Mao And Deng: On The Ideological Determinants Of Corporate Policies, Hao Liang, Rong Wang, Haikun Zhu

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Historically, economic activities have been organized around certain ideologies. We investigate the impact of politicians’ ideology on corporate policies by exploring a unique setting of ideological change—China from Mao to Deng around the 1978 economic reform—in a regression discontinuity framework. We find that the age discontinuity of politicians around 18 years old in 1978, who had already joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or joined soon thereafter and later became municipal paramount leaders, has had a lasting effect on contemporary firm- and city-level policies. In particular, firms in cities with mayors that joined the CCP under the ideological regime of …


Multinational Firms And Cash Holdings: Evidence From China, Weijun Wu, Yang Yang, Sili Zhou Feb 2017

Multinational Firms And Cash Holdings: Evidence From China, Weijun Wu, Yang Yang, Sili Zhou

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

To adapt to globalization, Chinese multinational firms have more exploitation of cash. This paper shows that Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) do not hold significantly more cash relative to domestic firms unless these multinationals heavily relay on the foreign sales. In addition, the multinationals of non-State-Owned Enterprises (Non-SOEs) exhibit the insignificant difference in cash holdings for non-multinationals. We also find that Chinese MNCs invest more but are less profitable, especially in non-SOE subsample. Overall, we conclude that the need of cash liquidity of multinational corporations in China is different from those in U.S.


Political Turnovers, Ownership, And Corporate Investment In China, Jerry X. Cao, Julio Brandon, Tiecheng Leng, Sili Zhou Oct 2016

Political Turnovers, Ownership, And Corporate Investment In China, Jerry X. Cao, Julio Brandon, Tiecheng Leng, Sili Zhou

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We examine the impact of political influence and ownership on corporate investment by exploiting the unique way provincial leaders are promoted in China. The tournament-style promotion system creates incentives for new governors to exert influence over investment in the early years of their term. We find a divergence in investment rates between state owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms following political turnover. SOEs increase investment by 6.0% following the turnover while investment rates for private firms decline, suggesting that the political influence exerted over SOEs may crowd out private investment.


Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang Apr 2016

Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Social capital can serve as informal governance in weak investor-protection regimes. Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs' political connections and firm ownership, we construct several original measures of social capital and examine their effect on the performance of entrepreneurial firms in China after their initial public offerings. Political connections or a high percentage of external investors tend to enhance firm performance, but intragroup related-party transactions commonly lead to performance decline. These forms of social capital have a strong influence on the performance of Chinese firms, whereas formal governance variables such as board size or board independence have little effect. Although social …


Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang Apr 2013

Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper explores the links between entrepreneurs' social capital and post-IPO firm performance in China's unique capital market and regulatory setting. Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs' political connections and firm financial information, we construct original measures for various types of social capital and examine their roles in determining the accounting and financial performance of entrepreneurial firms after an IPO. On one hand, firm accounting performance is enhanced by entrepreneurs' bridging social capital, such as political connections or a willingness to share power with external investors. On the other hand, bonding social capital such as intra-group related party transactions causes performance …


Corporate Philanthropy And Corporate Financial Performance: The Roles Of Social Response And Political Access, Heli Wang, Cuili Qian Dec 2011

Corporate Philanthropy And Corporate Financial Performance: The Roles Of Social Response And Political Access, Heli Wang, Cuili Qian

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Corporate philanthropy is expected to positively affect firm financial performance because it helps firms gain sociopolitical legitimacy, which enables them to elicit positive stakeholder responses and to gain political access. The positive philanthropy-performance relationship is stronger for firms with greater public visibility and for those with better past performance, as philanthropy by these firms gains more positive stakeholder responses. Firms that are not government-owned or politically well connected were shown to benefit more from philanthropy, as gaining political resources is more critical for such firms. Empirical analyses using data on Chinese firms listed on stock exchanges from 2001 to 2006 …


Disproportionate Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Non-Soes In China, Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Jinghua Tang, Gary Gang Tian Feb 2005

Disproportionate Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Non-Soes In China, Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Jinghua Tang, Gary Gang Tian

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.