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Full-Text Articles in Business
The Paradoxical Consequences Of Choice: Often Good For The Individual, Perhaps Less So For Society?, Shilpa Madan, Kevin Nanakdewa, Krishna Savani, Hazel Rose Markus
The Paradoxical Consequences Of Choice: Often Good For The Individual, Perhaps Less So For Society?, Shilpa Madan, Kevin Nanakdewa, Krishna Savani, Hazel Rose Markus
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The proliferation of products and services, together with the rise of social media, affords people the opportunity to make more choices than ever before. However, the requirement to think in terms of choice, or to use a choice mind-set, may have powerful but unexamined consequences for judgment and decision making, both for the chooser and for others. A choice mind-set leads people to engage in cognitive processes of discrimination and separation, to emphasize personal freedom and independent agency, and to focus on themselves rather than others. Reviewing research from social psychology, legal studies, health and nutrition, and consumer behavior, we …
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Melvyn Teo
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Melvyn Teo
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed firms raise more capital and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results cannot be explained by endogeneity, backfill bias, serial correlation, or manager manipulation, and are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
The Power Of The Weak, Martin Gargiulo, Gokhan Ertug
The Power Of The Weak, Martin Gargiulo, Gokhan Ertug
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Weak organizational actors can overcome the consequences of their dependence by securing the control of valuable resources or by embedding dependence relationships into social networks. While these strategies may not eliminate the underlying dependence, they can curtail the ability or the willingness of the stronger party to use power. Embedding strategies, however, can also have unintended consequences. Because the network structures that confer power to the weak are inherently more stable, they can persist beyond the point of being beneficial, trapping weak actors into unsuitable network structures. The power of the weak can thus become the weakness of the strong.
The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa
The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
An assumption in prior research is that debt is homogeneous and provides inappropriate governance for R&D investments. We argue that debt is heterogeneous: although transactional debt does indeed impose strict contractual constraints that provide inappropriate governance for R&D investments, relational debt has very different characteristics that provide more appropriate governance. Using a sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms that align their debt structures with their R&D investments perform better than those that are misaligned. Furthermore, firms tend to align their debt structure with R&D investments, but only after deregulation permits relatively free access to various types of debt.