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Bargaining Zone Distortion In Negotiations: The Elusive Power Of Multiple Alternatives, Michael Schaerer, David D. Loschelder, Roderick I. Swaab
Bargaining Zone Distortion In Negotiations: The Elusive Power Of Multiple Alternatives, Michael Schaerer, David D. Loschelder, Roderick I. Swaab
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We challenge the assumption that having multiple alternatives is always better than a single alternative by showing that negotiators who have additional alternatives ironically exhibit downward-biased perceptions of their own and their opponent’s reservation price, make lower demands, and achieve worse outcomes in distributive negotiations. Five studies demonstrate that the apparent benefits of multiple alternatives are elusive because multiple alternatives led to less ambitious first offers (Studies 1–2) and less profitable agreements (Study 3). This distributive disadvantage emerged because negotiators’ perception of the bargaining zone was more distorted when they had additional (less attractive) alternatives than when they only had …
The Too-Much Precision Effect: When And Why Precise Anchors Backfire With Experts, David D. Loschelder, Malte Friese, Michael Schaerer, Adam D. Galinsky
The Too-Much Precision Effect: When And Why Precise Anchors Backfire With Experts, David D. Loschelder, Malte Friese, Michael Schaerer, Adam D. Galinsky
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and …