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Full-Text Articles in Business
Competition Of The Informed: Does The Presence Of Short Sellers Affect Insider Selling?, Massimo Massa, Wenlan Qian, Weibiao Xu, Hong Zhang
Competition Of The Informed: Does The Presence Of Short Sellers Affect Insider Selling?, Massimo Massa, Wenlan Qian, Weibiao Xu, Hong Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We study how the presence of short sellers affects the incentives of the insiders to trade on negative information. We show it induces insiders to sell more (shares from their existing stakes) and trade faster to preempt the potential competition from short sellers. An experiment and instrumental variable analysis confirm this causal relationship. The effects are stronger for "opportunistic" (i.e., more informed) insider trades and when short sellers' attention is high. Return predictability of insider sales only occurs in stocks with high short-selling potential, suggesting that short sellers indirectly enhance the speed of information dissemination by accelerating trading by insiders. …
The Invisible Hand Of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?, Massimo Massa, Bohui Zhang, Hong Zhang
The Invisible Hand Of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?, Massimo Massa, Bohui Zhang, Hong Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-a-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.
On The Effectiveness Of Housing Purchase Restriction Policy In China: A Difference In Difference Approach, Jerry X. Cao, Bihong Huang, Rose Neng Lai
On The Effectiveness Of Housing Purchase Restriction Policy In China: A Difference In Difference Approach, Jerry X. Cao, Bihong Huang, Rose Neng Lai
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The Chinese government imposed the purchase restriction policy to rein in the housing bubble in 2010. Using a two-stage difference-in-difference approach and a comprehensive dataset covering the real estate markets across 70 cities, we find that the policy triggered substantial decline in the property price and transaction volume. Cities having higher reliance on real estate sector for fiscal revenue and economic growth experienced greater decline in housing prices following the policy implementation. However, the policy had no measurable effects on the nationwide construction boom, hinting the ineffectiveness of the policy to correct the housing bubble.