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Full-Text Articles in Business
Problem-Solving Or Self-Enhancement? A Power Perspective On How Ceos Affect R&D Search In The Face Of Inconsistent Feedback, Radina Blagoeva, Tom J. M. Mom, Justin J. P. Jansen, Gerard George
Problem-Solving Or Self-Enhancement? A Power Perspective On How Ceos Affect R&D Search In The Face Of Inconsistent Feedback, Radina Blagoeva, Tom J. M. Mom, Justin J. P. Jansen, Gerard George
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Firms consider multiple reference points simultaneously to assess performance, yet often these referents may be inconsistent in signaling success or failure. Consequently, decision makers use two contrasting decision rules when responding to inconsistent feedback: problem-solving or self-enhancement. So far, disparate theoretical logics and mixed evidence has limited our understanding about when decision makers may shift their attention from positive to negative aspects of inconsistent feedback or vice versa, and may increase or decrease their R&D search. We examine how different types of CEO power explain why some firms may respond to inconsistent feedback, i.e. positive performance feedback and negative prospects, …
Delayed Adoption Of Rules: A Relational Theory Of Firm Exposure And State Cooptation, Cyndi Man Zhang, Henrich. R. Greve
Delayed Adoption Of Rules: A Relational Theory Of Firm Exposure And State Cooptation, Cyndi Man Zhang, Henrich. R. Greve
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Thestate creates and changes rules that coerce firms, but firms can delay or decouple responses to rule changes in order to managethe cost of demands. Theoryof compliance to thestate has not yet considered the degree to which the firm candelay adoption because of low exposure to rules and state linksthat allow cooptation, butboth of these relations between state power and firm ability to counteract itcan affect the adoption decision. This makes the response to state rule changes a more strategic outcome than the theoryof coercive isomorphism implies. We develop a relational theory of delayed firmcompliance to a state rule change …
Anchors Weigh More Than Power: Why Absolute Powerlessness Liberates Negotiators To Achieve Better Outcomes, Michael Schaerer, Roderick I. Swaab, Adam D. Galinsky
Anchors Weigh More Than Power: Why Absolute Powerlessness Liberates Negotiators To Achieve Better Outcomes, Michael Schaerer, Roderick I. Swaab, Adam D. Galinsky
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The current research shows that having no power can be better than having a little power. Negotiators prefer having some power (weak negotiation alternatives) to having no power (no alternatives). We challenge this belief that having any alternative is beneficial by demonstrating that weak alternatives create low anchors that reduce the value of first offers. In contrast, having no alternatives is liberating because there is no anchor to weigh down first offers. In our experiments, negotiators with no alternatives felt less powerful but made higher first offers and secured superior outcomes compared with negotiators who had weak alternatives. We established …
The Power Of The Weak, Martin Gargiulo, Gokhan Ertug
The Power Of The Weak, Martin Gargiulo, Gokhan Ertug
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Weak organizational actors can overcome the consequences of their dependence by securing the control of valuable resources or by embedding dependence relationships into social networks. While these strategies may not eliminate the underlying dependence, they can curtail the ability or the willingness of the stronger party to use power. Embedding strategies, however, can also have unintended consequences. Because the network structures that confer power to the weak are inherently more stable, they can persist beyond the point of being beneficial, trapping weak actors into unsuitable network structures. The power of the weak can thus become the weakness of the strong.
Shoot For The Stars? Predicting The Recruitment Of Prestigious Directors At Newly Public Firms, Abhijith G. Acharya, Timothy G. Pollock
Shoot For The Stars? Predicting The Recruitment Of Prestigious Directors At Newly Public Firms, Abhijith G. Acharya, Timothy G. Pollock
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This study explores how CEOs' and outside directors' desires for the benefits of signaling and homophily intertwine with their concerns over maintaining power and preserving local status hierarchies to affect the likelihood a firm recruits prestigious outside directors to its board. Using pooled cross-sectional data on the five years following the IPOs of 210 firms that went public between 2001 and 2004, we found that prestigious CEOs and directors viewed the recruitment of prestigious new directors differently, and that these perceptions were moderated by factors that increase the salience of risk of the potential losses to the CEO and existing …