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Full-Text Articles in Business
The More The Merrier: How Psychological Standing And Work Group Size Explain Managers' Willingness To Communicate About Unethical Conduct In Their Work Group, Burak Oc, Maryam Kouchaki
The More The Merrier: How Psychological Standing And Work Group Size Explain Managers' Willingness To Communicate About Unethical Conduct In Their Work Group, Burak Oc, Maryam Kouchaki
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Business ethics research has long examined the dichotomy between remaining silent or reporting ethical misconduct to a third party. Little is known, however, about ethical conversations within a work group after observing misconduct. Specifically, we do not know how many members of their work group individuals choose to communicate with. These conversations could have important implications for creating an ethical workplace. We propose that psychological standing is an important driver of individuals' decisions not to remain silent and to instead raise moral concerns with a greater number of others in their work group. In addition, integrating existing work on structural …
Relative Power And Interpersonal Trust, Christilene Du Plessis, My Hoang Bao Nguyen, Trevor A. Foulk, Michael Schaerer
Relative Power And Interpersonal Trust, Christilene Du Plessis, My Hoang Bao Nguyen, Trevor A. Foulk, Michael Schaerer
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Because trust is essential in the development and maintenance of well-functioning relationships, scholars across numerous scientific disciplines have sought to determine what causes people to trust others. Power dynamics are known to predict trust, but research on the relationship between power and trust is inconclusive, with mixed results and without systematic consideration of how the relative power distribution within dyadic relationships may influence trust in those relationships. Building on interdependence theory, we propose that both individuals in an unequal-power dyad trust each other less than individuals in an equal-power dyad because unequal-power dyads heighten the perception of a conflict of …
Power And Negotiation: Review Of Current Evidence And Future Directions, Michael Schaerer, Laurel Teo, Nikhil Madan, Roderick I. Swaab
Power And Negotiation: Review Of Current Evidence And Future Directions, Michael Schaerer, Laurel Teo, Nikhil Madan, Roderick I. Swaab
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This review synthesizes the impact of power on individual and joint negotiation performance. Although power generally has positive effects on negotiators’ individual performance (value claiming), recent work suggests that more power is not always beneficial. Taking a dyadic perspective, we also find mixed evidence for how power affects joint performance (value creation); some studies show that equal-power dyads create more value than unequal-power dyads, but others find the opposite. We identify the source of power, power distribution, and competitiveness as critical moderators of this relationship. Finally, we suggest that future research should move beyond studying alternatives in dyadic deal-making, identify …
Win-Win In Distributive Negotiations: The Economic And Relational Benefits Of Strategic Offer Framing, Michael Schaerer, Martin Schweinsberg, Nico Thornley, Roderick I. Swaab
Win-Win In Distributive Negotiations: The Economic And Relational Benefits Of Strategic Offer Framing, Michael Schaerer, Martin Schweinsberg, Nico Thornley, Roderick I. Swaab
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
In distributive negotiations, people often feel that they have to choose between maximizing their economic outcomes (claiming more value) or improving their relational outcomes (having a satisfied opponent). The present research proposes a conversational strategy that can help negotiators achieve both. Specifically, we show that using an offer framing strategy that shifts offer recipients’ attention to their reservation price (e.g., “How does my offer compare to your minimum price?”) leads to both (a) an assimilation effect whereby recipients make more favorable counteroffers (economic benefit) as well as (b) a contrast effect whereby recipients feel more satisfied with the negotiation (relational …
Delayed Adoption Of Rules: A Relational Theory Of Firm Exposure And State Cooptation, Cyndi Man Zhang, Henrich. R. Greve
Delayed Adoption Of Rules: A Relational Theory Of Firm Exposure And State Cooptation, Cyndi Man Zhang, Henrich. R. Greve
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Thestate creates and changes rules that coerce firms, but firms can delay or decouple responses to rule changes in order to managethe cost of demands. Theoryof compliance to thestate has not yet considered the degree to which the firm candelay adoption because of low exposure to rules and state linksthat allow cooptation, butboth of these relations between state power and firm ability to counteract itcan affect the adoption decision. This makes the response to state rule changes a more strategic outcome than the theoryof coercive isomorphism implies. We develop a relational theory of delayed firmcompliance to a state rule change …
Imaginary Alternatives: The Impact Of Mental Simulation On Powerless Negotiators, Michael Schaerer, Martin Schweinsberg, Roderick I. Swaab
Imaginary Alternatives: The Impact Of Mental Simulation On Powerless Negotiators, Michael Schaerer, Martin Schweinsberg, Roderick I. Swaab
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The present research demonstrates that negotiators can act powerfully without having power.Researchers and practitioners advise people to obtain strong alternatives prior to negotiating toenhance their power. However, alternatives are not always readily available, often forcingnegotiators to negotiate without much, or any, power. Building on research suggesting thatsubjective feelings of power and objective outcomes are disconnected and that mental simulationcan increase individuals’ aspirations, we hypothesized that the mental imagery of a strongalternative could provide similar psychological benefits to having an actual alternative. Ourstudies demonstrate that imagining strong alternatives causes individuals to negotiate moreambitiously and provides them with a distributive advantage: negotiators …
The Four Horsemen Of Power At The Bargaining Table, Adam D. Galinsky, Michael Schaerer, Joe C. Magee
The Four Horsemen Of Power At The Bargaining Table, Adam D. Galinsky, Michael Schaerer, Joe C. Magee
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper aims to identify and discuss four major sources of power in negotiations. Findings: The four sources of power are alternatives, information, status and social capital. Each of these sources of power can enhance a negotiator’s likelihood of obtaining their ideal outcome because power allows negotiators to be more confident and proactive, and it shields them from the bargaining tactics of their opponents. Practical implications: The paper discusses how negotiators can utilize each source of power to improve their negotiation outcomes. Originality/value: The paper provides a parsimonious definition of power in negotiations, identifies the four major sources of negotiator …
Bargaining Zone Distortion In Negotiations: The Elusive Power Of Multiple Alternatives, Michael Schaerer, David D. Loschelder, Roderick I. Swaab
Bargaining Zone Distortion In Negotiations: The Elusive Power Of Multiple Alternatives, Michael Schaerer, David D. Loschelder, Roderick I. Swaab
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We challenge the assumption that having multiple alternatives is always better than a single alternative by showing that negotiators who have additional alternatives ironically exhibit downward-biased perceptions of their own and their opponent’s reservation price, make lower demands, and achieve worse outcomes in distributive negotiations. Five studies demonstrate that the apparent benefits of multiple alternatives are elusive because multiple alternatives led to less ambitious first offers (Studies 1–2) and less profitable agreements (Study 3). This distributive disadvantage emerged because negotiators’ perception of the bargaining zone was more distorted when they had additional (less attractive) alternatives than when they only had …
Secret Conversation Opportunities Facilitate Minority Influence In Virtual Groups: The Influence On Majority Power, Information Processing, And Decision Quality, Roderick I. Swaab, Katherine W. Phillips, Michael Schaerer
Secret Conversation Opportunities Facilitate Minority Influence In Virtual Groups: The Influence On Majority Power, Information Processing, And Decision Quality, Roderick I. Swaab, Katherine W. Phillips, Michael Schaerer
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We examined the impact of secret conversation opportunities during virtual team discussions on majority opinion holders’ motivation to attend to minority opinion holders. Studies 1a and b showed that majorities were more motivated to process others’ arguments when secret conversation opportunities were available (vs. not), provided these arguments contained unique (vs. shared) information and this information was offered by the minority (vs. majority). Study 2 demonstrated that this effect occurs because secret opportunities made majorities feel less powerful after being exposed to unique information from the minority (Study 2a), especially when majority members expected others to use these channels (Study …
Speaking Truth To Power: The Effect Of Candid Feedback On How Individuals With Power Allocate Resources, Burak Oc, Michael R. Bashshur, Celia Moore
Speaking Truth To Power: The Effect Of Candid Feedback On How Individuals With Power Allocate Resources, Burak Oc, Michael R. Bashshur, Celia Moore
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Subordinates are often seen as impotent, able to react to but not affect how powerholders treat them. Instead, we conceptualize subordinate feedback as an important trigger of powerholders’ behavioral self-regulation, and explore subordinates’ reciprocal influence on how powerholders allocate resources to them over time. In two experiments using a multi-party, multi-round dictator game paradigm, we find that when subordinates provided candid feedback about whether they found prior allocations to be fair or unfair, powerholders regulated how self-interested their allocations were over time. However, when subordinates provided compliant feedback about powerholders’ prior allocation decisions (offered consistently positive feedback, regardless of the …
Anchors Weigh More Than Power: Why Absolute Powerlessness Liberates Negotiators To Achieve Better Outcomes, Michael Schaerer, Roderick I. Swaab, Adam D. Galinsky
Anchors Weigh More Than Power: Why Absolute Powerlessness Liberates Negotiators To Achieve Better Outcomes, Michael Schaerer, Roderick I. Swaab, Adam D. Galinsky
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The current research shows that having no power can be better than having a little power. Negotiators prefer having some power (weak negotiation alternatives) to having no power (no alternatives). We challenge this belief that having any alternative is beneficial by demonstrating that weak alternatives create low anchors that reduce the value of first offers. In contrast, having no alternatives is liberating because there is no anchor to weigh down first offers. In our experiments, negotiators with no alternatives felt less powerful but made higher first offers and secured superior outcomes compared with negotiators who had weak alternatives. We established …
The Power Of The Weak, Martin Gargiulo, Gokhan Ertug
The Power Of The Weak, Martin Gargiulo, Gokhan Ertug
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Weak organizational actors can overcome the consequences of their dependence by securing the control of valuable resources or by embedding dependence relationships into social networks. While these strategies may not eliminate the underlying dependence, they can curtail the ability or the willingness of the stronger party to use power. Embedding strategies, however, can also have unintended consequences. Because the network structures that confer power to the weak are inherently more stable, they can persist beyond the point of being beneficial, trapping weak actors into unsuitable network structures. The power of the weak can thus become the weakness of the strong.
Power Motivates Interpersonal Connection Following Social Exclusion, Jayanth Narayanan, Kenneth Tai, Zoe Kinias
Power Motivates Interpersonal Connection Following Social Exclusion, Jayanth Narayanan, Kenneth Tai, Zoe Kinias
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Research has systematically documented the negative effects of social exclusion, yet little is known about how these negative effects can be mitigated. Building on the approach-inhibition theory of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), we examined the role of power in facilitating social connection following exclusion. Four experiments found that following exclusion, high power (relative to low power) individuals intend to socially connect more with others. Specifically, following exclusion, individuals primed with high power sought new social connections more than those primed with low power (Studies 1–4) or those receiving no power prime (Study 1). The intention to seek social …
Masters Of The Universe: How Power And Accountability Influence Self-Serving Decisions Under Moral Hazard, Marko Pitesa, Stefan Thau
Masters Of The Universe: How Power And Accountability Influence Self-Serving Decisions Under Moral Hazard, Marko Pitesa, Stefan Thau
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This article provides an answer to the question of why agents make self-serving decisions under moral hazard and how their self-serving decisions can be kept in check through institutional arrangements. Our theoretical model predicts that the agents' power and the manner in which they are held accountable jointly determine their propensity to make self-serving decisions. We test our theory in the context of financial investment decisions made under moral hazard using others' funds. Across 3 studies, using different decision-making tasks, different manipulations of power and accountability, and different samples, we show that agents' power makes them more likely to behave …
Do Suppliers Benefit From Collaborative Relationships With Large Retailers? An Empirical Investigation Of Efficient Consumer Response Adoption, Daniel Corsten, Nirmalya Kumar
Do Suppliers Benefit From Collaborative Relationships With Large Retailers? An Empirical Investigation Of Efficient Consumer Response Adoption, Daniel Corsten, Nirmalya Kumar
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Collaborative manufacturer-retailer relationships based on efficient consumer response (ECR) have become ubiquitous over the past decade. Yet academic studies of ECR adoption and its impact on marketing relationships are relatively scarce. Inspired by the relational view of competitive advantage, the authors empirically investigate whether the extent to which suppliers of a major retailer adopt ECR has a beneficial impact on their outcomes. The results demonstrate that whereas ECR adoption has a positive impact on supplier economic performance and capability development, it also generates greater perceptions of negative inequity on the part of the supplier. However, retailer capabilities and supplier trust …
Stereotype Reactance At The Bargaining Table: The Effect Of Stereotype Activation And Power On Claiming And Creating Value, Laura J. Kray, Jochen Reb, Adam D. Galinsky, Leigh Thompson
Stereotype Reactance At The Bargaining Table: The Effect Of Stereotype Activation And Power On Claiming And Creating Value, Laura J. Kray, Jochen Reb, Adam D. Galinsky, Leigh Thompson
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Two experiments explored the hypothesis that the impact of activating gender stereotypes on negotiated agreements in mixed-gender negotiations depends on the manner in which the stereo-type is activated (explicitly vs. implicitly) and the content of the stereotype (linking negotiation performance to stereotypically male vs. stereotypically female traits). Specifically, two experiments investigated the generality and limits of stereotype reactance. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that negotiated outcomes become more one-sided in favor of the high power negotiator when masculine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In contrast, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that negotiated outcomes are more integrative …