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Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

Ownership structure

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Full-Text Articles in Business

Substitutes Or Complements? A Configurational Examination Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Vilmos Misangyi, Abhijith G. Acharya Dec 2014

Substitutes Or Complements? A Configurational Examination Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Vilmos Misangyi, Abhijith G. Acharya

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We conduct an exploratory qualitative comparative case analysis of the S&P 1500 firms with the aim of elaborating theory on how corporate governance mechanisms work together effectively. To do so, we integrate extant theory and research to specify the bundle of mechanisms that operate to mitigate the agency problem among publicly traded corporations and review what previous research has said about how these mechanisms combine. We then use the fuzzy-set approach to qualitative comparitive analysis (QCA) to explore the combinations of governance mechanisms that exist among the S&P 1500 firms that achieve high (and not-high) profitability. Our findings suggest that …


The Impact Of Ownership Structure On Wage Intensity In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Parthiban David Apr 2005

The Impact Of Ownership Structure On Wage Intensity In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Parthiban David

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The authors studied the effect of ownership structure on human capital investments as indicated by wage intensity, defined as the ratio of expenditure on employee wages to sales, in a sample of 996 Japanese manufacturing firms during their economic recession of 1998-2002. They found that domestic shareholders, with interests beyond financial considerations, enhance wage intensity, especially when performance is low, and thereby safeguard human capital investments. Foreign shareholders with sole interest in financial returns have an opposite effect; they reduce wage intensity when firm performance is low.


The Effects Of Ownership And Capital Structure On Board Composition And Strategic Diversification In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan Mar 2005

The Effects Of Ownership And Capital Structure On Board Composition And Strategic Diversification In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The board of directors plays an important role in solving the agency problem between shareholders and management. This paper investigates the relationships between ownership and board structure with the diversification strategy of large Japanese firms. The results show that corporate nominee directors are associated with lower levels of product diversification of their investee firms. This suggests that nominee directors in large Japanese corporations see themselves representing specific interests and therefore investors should pay attention to board composition in order to assess the level of protection they can expect to receive. Even without any apparent agency problem with management, there remains …


The Performance Implications Of Ownership Driven Governance Reform, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan Dec 2003

The Performance Implications Of Ownership Driven Governance Reform, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper explores the performance impact of recent changes in foreign shareholdings and boardroom reforms in Japan. Empirical research on the impact of reform on the Japanese corporate governance system could provide useful lessons for their European counterparts who are themselves facing similar pressures to reform. We found that although participation of outside directors in strategic decision-making was associated with positive stock returns, the increase in the ratio of outside directors, the separation of the board members and executive officers, and the reduction of board size were not related to firm performance.