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Duopolistic Competition Under Risk Aversion And Uncertainty, Michail Chronopoulos, Bert De Reyck, Afzal Siddiqui
Duopolistic Competition Under Risk Aversion And Uncertainty, Michail Chronopoulos, Bert De Reyck, Afzal Siddiqui
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
A monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and the level of risk aversion increase. By contrast, the presence of a rival typically hastens entry under risk neutrality. Here, we examine these two opposing effects in a duopoly setting. We demonstrate that the value of a firm and its entry decision behave differently with risk aversion and uncertainty depending on the type of competition. Interestingly, if the leader’s role is defined endogenously, then higher uncertainty makes her relatively better off, whereas with the roles exogenously defined, the impact of uncertainty is ambiguous.
On ‘‘Investment Decisions In The Theory Of Finance: Some Antinomies And Inconsistencies’’, Bert De Reyck
On ‘‘Investment Decisions In The Theory Of Finance: Some Antinomies And Inconsistencies’’, Bert De Reyck
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
In the paper “Investment Decisions in the Theory of Finance: Some antinomies and inconsistencies”, Magni [Eur. J. Operat. Res. 137 (2002) 206] shows that using the net present value rule for making investment decisions can lead to inconsistencies and antinomies. The author claims that the so-called equivalent-risk tenet of finance, whereby an investor needs to compare an investment opportunity with an asset of equivalent risk, is impossible to implement. In this paper, we show that the main thesis of this paper is incorrect, and that finance theory, when applied correctly, can be used to value investment projects by comparing assets …