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Managerial Ability And The Valuation Of Executive Stock Options, Tung-Hsiao Yang
Managerial Ability And The Valuation Of Executive Stock Options, Tung-Hsiao Yang
LSU Doctoral Dissertations
The executive compensation literature argues that executives generally value stock options at less than market value because of suboptimal ownership and risk aversion. Implicit in this finding is the assumption that executives are, like shareholders, price takers. That is, they have no ability to influence the outcomes of the firm’s investments. Clearly, executives do have the ability to influence these outcomes, because that is the purpose of granting them the options. In this paper, we develop a model in which managers can exert effort and alter the distribution of the returns from the firm’s investments. We find that when executives …