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Market Efficiency And The Returns To Simple Technical Trading Rules: New Evidence From U.S. Equity Market And Chinese Equity Markets, Gary Gang Tian, Guang Hua Wan, Mingyuan Guo
Market Efficiency And The Returns To Simple Technical Trading Rules: New Evidence From U.S. Equity Market And Chinese Equity Markets, Gary Gang Tian, Guang Hua Wan, Mingyuan Guo
Gary Tian
Numerous studies in the finance literature have investigated technical analysis to determine its validity as an investment tool. This study is an attempt to explore whether some forms of technical analysis can predict stock price movement and make excess profits based on certain trading rules in markets with different efficiency level. To avoid using arbitrarily selected 26 trading rules as did by Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) and later by Bessembinder and Chan (1998), this paper examines predictive power and profitability of simple trading rules by expanding their universe of 26 rules to 412 rules. In order to find out …
Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market? Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market? Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
This paper investigates venture capitalists' monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems have a greater impact on …