Business Commons^™

Shareholder Influence Over Director Nomination Via Proxy Access: Implications For Agency Conflict And Stakeholder Value, Joanna Tochman Campbell, T. Colin Campbell, David G. Sirmon, Leonard Bierman, Chris S. Tuggle

Department of Management: Faculty Publications

Corporate governance research indicates that corporate boards of directors may be overly beholden to management, which can be detrimental to firm value creation. Drawing upon agency theory and the governance law literature, we examine the effects of a new SEC rule designed to lessen managerial power by increasing large, long-term shareholders’ influence in the director nomination process. We predict and find support for a positive overall market reaction to the rule’s announcement as well as a greater reaction for firms with characteristics that suggest compromised board independence or greater CEO control. Moreover, we examine the implications of greater shareholder voice …

Hospital Boards And Hospital Strategic Focus: The Impact Of Board Involvement In Strategic Decision Making, Karen Ford-Eickhoff, Donde Ashmos Plowman, Reuben R. Mcdaniel Jr.

Department of Management: Faculty Publications

Background: Despite pressures to change the role of hospital boards, hospitals have made few changes in board composition or director selection criteria. Hospital boards have often continued to operate in their traditional roles as either “monitors” or “advisors.” More attention to the direct involvement of hospital boards in the strategic decision-making process of the organizations they serve, the timing and circumstances under which board involvement occurs, and the board composition that enhances their abilities to participate fully is needed.

Purposes: We investigated the relationship between broader expertise among hospital board members, board involvement in the stages of strategic decision making, …

Commanding Board Of Director Attention: Investigating How Organizational Performance And Ceo Duality Affect Board Members' Attention To Monitoring, Chris S. Tuggle, David G. Sirmon, Chris R. Reutzel, Leonard Bierman

Department of Management: Faculty Publications

Boards of directors’ attention to monitoring represents an understudied topic in corporate governance. By analyzing hundreds of board meeting transcripts, we find that board members do not maintain constant levels of attention toward monitoring, but instead selectively allocate attention to their monitoring function. Drawing from the attention-based view, prospect theory, and the literature on power, we find that deviation from prior performance and CEO duality affect this allocation. Specifically, while negative deviation from prior performance increases boards’ attention to monitoring, positive deviation from prior performance reduces it. The presence of duality also reduces the boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring. …