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Department of Management: Faculty Publications

Agency theory

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Full-Text Articles in Business

Competitive Repertoire Complexity: Governance Antecedents And Performance Outcomes, Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, David J. Ketchen Jr., Christina Matz Carnes, Walter J. Ferrier Jan 2017

Competitive Repertoire Complexity: Governance Antecedents And Performance Outcomes, Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, David J. Ketchen Jr., Christina Matz Carnes, Walter J. Ferrier

Department of Management: Faculty Publications

Research summary: Past inquiry has found that implementing complex competitive repertoires (i.e., diverse and dynamic arrays of actions) is challenging, but firms benefit from doing so. Our examination of the antecedents and outcomes of complex competitive repertoires develops a more nuanced perspective. Data from 1,168 firms in 204 industries reveal that complexity initially harms performance, but then becomes a positive factor, except at high levels. We use agency and tournament theories, respectively, to examine how key governance mechanisms—ownership structure and executive compensation—help shape firms’ competitive repertoires. We find that the principals of agency theory and the pay gap of tournament …


Shareholder Influence Over Director Nomination Via Proxy Access: Implications For Agency Conflict And Stakeholder Value, Joanna Tochman Campbell, T. Colin Campbell, David G. Sirmon, Leonard Bierman, Chris S. Tuggle Dec 2012

Shareholder Influence Over Director Nomination Via Proxy Access: Implications For Agency Conflict And Stakeholder Value, Joanna Tochman Campbell, T. Colin Campbell, David G. Sirmon, Leonard Bierman, Chris S. Tuggle

Department of Management: Faculty Publications

Corporate governance research indicates that corporate boards of directors may be overly beholden to management, which can be detrimental to firm value creation. Drawing upon agency theory and the governance law literature, we examine the effects of a new SEC rule designed to lessen managerial power by increasing large, long-term shareholders’ influence in the director nomination process. We predict and find support for a positive overall market reaction to the rule’s announcement as well as a greater reaction for firms with characteristics that suggest compromised board independence or greater CEO control. Moreover, we examine the implications of greater shareholder voice …