Business Commons^™

The Correlation And Effectiveness Between Two Variables That Are Considered In Sustainable Investing: Esg Ratings And Credit Ratings, Kelly Z. Zhuang

Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

No abstract provided.

Culture And Enforcement Effects On Insider Trading, Market Reactions, And Firm Value: Evidence From The Market Abuse Regulation, Amanda M. Olsen

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation examines the changes to the European Union (EU) law on market abuse, market manipulation, and insider trading regulation made when the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) was enacted. I detail the changes in comparison to the previous legislation under the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and changes several Member States made to their domestic legislation to achieve compliance with MAR. I highlight the sanctions imposed in several Member States to argue the severity of punishment under MAR. This analysis provides evidence that MAR brought about a plausibly exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading. Next, I examine the effects …

The Cost Of Big Data: Evaluating The Effects Of The European Union’S General Data Protection Regulation, Kara Rebecca White

Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

No abstract provided.

Poison Pills And Their Effect On Shareholder Return, Katherine G. Fowlkes

Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

No abstract provided.

Valuation And Value Drivers For Us Based Airlines, An Analysis Of An Industry, Ryan Caveney

Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

No abstract provided.

Does Political Giving Impact Shareholder Wealth? Evidence From State Campaign Finance Reforms, Douglas Brian Blank Ii

Doctoral Dissertations

Does corporate political giving actually affect shareholder wealth? While firms value political participation, some lawmakers oppose corporate involvement in politics. Yet, the existing literature has established a correlation between campaign finance and corporate outcomes without fully documenting a causal relation. I use an innovative database of political giving to exploit changes in state campaign finance laws as an exogenous shock to political giving. Specifically, I use the staggered adoption of externally imposed legal limits to political giving across U.S. states to expose how shareholder wealth responds. I find shareholder wealth declines following legally imposed reductions in political giving. The causal …

Role Of Inside Directors In Mitigating Negative Effects Of Outside Directors’ Busyness, Syed Mainuddin Kamal

Doctoral Dissertations

In this study, I investigate the effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance, and how the presence of a certified inside director (CID) on the board alters the busyness effect. Busy outside directors are over-stretched to provide adequate monitoring. Certified inside directors (CIDs), inside directors holding a directorship at an unaffiliated firm, have director labor market incentives to focus on their own firm’s performance and share firm-specific information to outside directors for effective monitoring. I find that the negative effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance is mitigated when a firm’s board includes a certified inside director (CID). …

Theory And Experiments Exploring Behavioral, Financial, And Public Economics, Matthew John Mcmahon

Doctoral Dissertations

I study three questions which relate to one another only in that each explores facets of economics. First, I theoretically examine the conditions under which introducing an impure public good decreases total public provision. I introduce a central planner who can tax the private good to correct this and identify the market characteristics that typify this scenario. Second, I test the two standard competing dividend puzzle hypotheses using a laboratory experiment. Evidence from the lab, including variables unobservable in the field, reinforces empirical work supporting the outcome model over the substitute. Last, I obscure from dictators information regarding recipients' income …

The Importance Of Executive Effort, Lee Edward Biggerstaff

Doctoral Dissertations

Agency theory stipulates that managerial effort is important to shareholders and costly for managers to provide. Executives may provide sub-optimal levels of effort because shareholders cannot easily observe the day-to-day actions of managers and therefore have difficulties properly monitoring the effort provided by firm management. Researchers also face the challenge of measuring executive effort. In this dissertation, I use an observable measure of leisure consumption to proxy for the effort provided by executives to study the impact of executive effort on firm outcomes.

In the first essay, I focus on Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”) and the impact of their effort …

Politically Connected Analysts, Michael B. Mcdonald

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation examines politically-connected equity analysts, i.e., analysts that make large political donations. I find that these big donor analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts than other small donor and non-donor analysts, and the accuracy of these forecasts decreases after a big donor analyst ceases his donations. These analysts become more accurate after they become large political donors, suggesting their enhanced performance derives from an advantage gained via their political activity. These results are stronger when (i) the analyst works or lives in the state represented by the benefiting politician, and (ii) the benefiting politician serves on a Congressional committee …

Corporate Headquarters Relocations Announcements: Their Incidence Ratios, Industry Distribution, And Shareholder Wealth Effects, Bartholomew H. Rhoades

Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

No abstract provided.

Ownership Structure And Monitoring Around Secondary Offerings, Joshua Tyler White

Doctoral Dissertations

Secondary offerings represent a unique setting to examine investors’ perception of the value of monitoring intensity around changes in block ownership. I find blockholders present at 97% of firms with a secondary offering over 1998-2006. These blockholders participate in 87% of secondary offerings and offer the majority of secondary shares in 75% of these offerings. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of ownership structure, I empirically test two hypotheses explaining secondary offering announcement returns and underpricing based on seller heterogeneities: the information hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis. The results largely support the monitoring hypothesis. Secondary offerings by close, active monitors who …

Cross-Listed Firms And Shareholder-Initiated Lawsuits: The Market Penalties Of Securities Class Action Lawsuits Against Foreign Firms, Kathryn Mary Schumann

Doctoral Dissertations

This paper examines the market penalties levied by shareholders against firms that are alleged to have violated securities laws within the U.S. Using a sample of private securities class action cases brought against foreign firms that cross-list on the major U.S. exchanges, this paper presents evidence that the enforcement risk criticism may not be as severe as initially thought. I examine market penalties at alleged violation disclosure dates and securities class action filing dates and find that each event corresponds to an economically and statistically significant loss of value for the accused firm. On average I find that the violation …

Designated Directors In The Boardroom: Their Impact On Governance And Performance And Shareholder Wealth Effects, Laura Seery Cole

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation examines the appointment of designated directors on boards of directors. Designated director appointments are uncontested board appointments by activist investors, whereby normal nominating and voting election procedures are circumvented. Instances such as these, where directors are appointed rather than elected, are a form of shareholder access to the proxy. In this dissertation, new evidence is provided that is relevant to the proxy access debate by investigating the hypothesis that firms with appointed designated directors have different firm and governance characteristics than firms with elected directors. In particular, the following questions are asked: what are the shareholder wealth effects …