Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Economics (2)
- Government Regulation (2)
- Securities Law (2)
- Accounting (1)
- Bargaining power (1)
-
- Business Entities (1)
- Contract (1)
- Corporations (1)
- Employees (1)
- Employers (1)
- Employment Discrimination Law (1)
- Inequality (1)
- International Law (1)
- Labor (1)
- Labor Economics (1)
- Leisure (1)
- Mandatory terms (1)
- NLRA (1)
- National labor relations act (1)
- Politics (1)
- Social hierarchy (1)
- Status (1)
- Unions (1)
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Business
The Myth Of Equality In The Employment Relation, Aditi Bagchi
The Myth Of Equality In The Employment Relation, Aditi Bagchi
All Faculty Scholarship
Although it is widely understood that employers and employees are not equally situated, we fail adequately to account for this inequality in the law governing their relationship. We can best understand this inequality in terms of status, which encompasses one’s level of income, leisure and discretion. For a variety of misguided reasons, contract law has been historically highly resistant to the introduction of status-based principles. Courts have preferred to characterize the unfavorable circumstances that many employees face as the product of unequal bargaining power. But bargaining power disparity does not capture the moral problem raised by inequality in the employment …
Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, Jonah B. Gelbach, Jonathan Klick, Lesley Wexler
Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, Jonah B. Gelbach, Jonathan Klick, Lesley Wexler
All Faculty Scholarship
Economists have long recognized employers’ ability to construct benefits packages to induce workers to sort themselves into and out of jobs. For instance, to encourage applications from individuals with a highly valued but largely unobservable characteristic, such as patience, employers might offer benefits that patient individuals are likely to value more than other individuals. By offering a compensation package with highly valued benefits but a relatively low wage, employers will attract workers with the favored characteristic and discourage other individuals from applying for or accepting the job. While economic theory generally views this kind of self-selection in value neutral terms, …
Treatment Differences And Political Realities In The Gaap-Ifrs Debate, William W. Bratton, Lawrence A. Cunningham
Treatment Differences And Political Realities In The Gaap-Ifrs Debate, William W. Bratton, Lawrence A. Cunningham
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Federalism, Variation, And State Regulation Of Franchise Termination, Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi, Larry Ribstein
Federalism, Variation, And State Regulation Of Franchise Termination, Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi, Larry Ribstein
All Faculty Scholarship
This article discusses and expands on our recent work examining the effects of franchise-termination laws. In a prior article, we examined empirically the effect of franchise-termination laws on the level of franchise activity. Our analysis improved upon the prior literature in two major ways. First, our work exploited two new sources of panel data to provide new empirical evidence on the effect of franchise termination laws. Second, our analysis examined variation in states’ restrictions on the ability of franchisors and franchisees to contract around a particular state’s regulation. We found that the effects of termination laws on the overall level …
Unentrapped, William W. Bratton