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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Business
Teece's Competing Through Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Teece's Competing Through Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay reviews David J. Teece's book, Competing Through Innovation: Technological Strategies and Antitrust Policies (2013).
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.
As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to …
Competition Policy And The Technologies Of Information, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Competition Policy And The Technologies Of Information, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
When we speak about information and competition policy we are usually thinking about oral or written communications that have an anticompetitive potential, and mainly in the context of collusion of exclusionary threats. These are important topics. Indeed, among the most difficult problems that competition policy has had to confront over the years is understanding communications that can be construed as either threats to exclude or as offers to collude or facilitators of collusion.
My topic here, however, is the relationship between information technologies and competition policy. Technological change can both induce and undermine the use of information to facilitate anticompetitive …
Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for assessing the competitive effects of horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws. These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval between them and previous Guidelines but also because enforcement policy had drifted far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive mainly for two things. One is briefer and less detailed treatment of market delineation. The other is an expanded set of theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already occurred.
The …
Consumer Welfare In Competition And Intellectual Property Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Consumer Welfare In Competition And Intellectual Property Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Whether antitrust policy should pursue a goal of "general welfare" or "consumer welfare" has been debated for decades. The academic debate is much more varied than the case law, however, which has consistently adopted consumer welfare as a goal, almost never condemning a practice found to produce an actual output reduction or price increase simply because productive efficiency gains accruing to producers exceeded consumer losses.
While some practices such as mergers might produce greater gains in productive efficiency than losses in consumer welfare, identifying such situations would be extraordinarily difficult. First, these efficiencies would have to be "transaction specific," meaning …