Business Commons^™

Contractual Remedies In Mergers: Lessons From Crispo V. Musk, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Geeyoung Min

Law & Economics Working Papers

The Delaware Chancery Court recently restricted a merger target's ability to recover damages on behalf of its shareholders from a breaching buyer. This paper investigates the impact of the decision. First, we present a theoretical analysis to generate empirical predictions. Second, we show that the decision led to a decrease in the firm value of targets in mergers governed by Delaware law. Third, we hand-collect relevant provisions from merger agreements and find that the agreements governed by Delaware law increasingly include target-friendly non-price terms after the decision. We also present evidence suggesting deal price responds to the inclusion of novel …

Beyond Profit Motives, William J. Moon

Michigan Law Review

A review of The Profit Motive: Defending Shareholder Value Maximization By Stephen M. Bainbridge.

Retail Investors And Corporate Governance: Evidence From Zero-Commission Trading, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

We examine the effects of the sudden abolition of trading commissions by major online brokerages in 2019, which lowered stock market entry costs for retail investors, on corporate governance. Firms already popular with retail investors experienced positive abnormal returns around the abolition of commissions. Firms with positive abnormal returns in response to commission-free trading subsequently saw a decrease in institutional ownership, a decrease in shareholder voting, and a deterioration in environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) metrics. Finally, these firms were more likely to adopt bylaw amendments to reduce the percentage of shares needed for a quorum at shareholder meetings. …

Protecting The Sovereign's Money Monopoly, Gary B. Gorton, Jeffery Zhang

Articles

Sovereign states have held a monopoly over the production of circulating money for well over a century. Governments, not private entities, issue circulating money. The advent of stablecoins—privately issued digital money that can circulate—raises the question of the sovereign’s money monopoly from the grave. Should private money circulate alongside sovereign money in the twenty-first century? We argue against coexistence to preserve financial stability and monetary sovereignty.

Through the lens of economic theory, we explore the coexistence question by revisiting the original debates that led to the sovereign’s money monopoly in England, the United States, Canada, and Sweden. In each case, …