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Full-Text Articles in Business
Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused By Households: Uncertainty, Prices, And Income, Carlos Chávez, John K. Stranlund, Walter Gómez
Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused By Households: Uncertainty, Prices, And Income, Carlos Chávez, John K. Stranlund, Walter Gómez
John K. Stranlund
We examine the control of air pollution caused by households burning wood for heating and cooking in the developing world. Since the problem is one of controlling emissions from nonpoint sources, regulations are likely to be directed at household choices of wood consumption and combustion technologies. Moreover, these choices are subtractions from, or contributions to, the pure public good of air quality. Consequently, the efficient policy design is not independent of the distribution of household income. Since it is unrealistic to assume that environmental authorities can make lump sum income transfers part of control policies, efficient control of air pollution …
Who Should Bear The Administrative Costs Of An Emissions Tax?, John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chavez
Who Should Bear The Administrative Costs Of An Emissions Tax?, John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chavez
John K. Stranlund
All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it …
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.