Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Business
Would Order-By-Order Auctions Be Competitive?, Thomas Ernst, Chester Spatt, Jian Sun
Would Order-By-Order Auctions Be Competitive?, Thomas Ernst, Chester Spatt, Jian Sun
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We model two different methods of executing segregated retail orders: broker's routing, whereby brokers allocate orders using market maker's overall performance, and order-by-order auctions, where market makers bid on individual orders, a recent SEC proposal. Order-by-order auctions improve market maker allocative efficiency, but face a winner's curse reducing retail investor welfare, particularly when liquidity is limited. Additional market participants competing for retail orders fail to improve total efficiency and investor welfare when entrants possess information superior to incumbent wholesalers. Existing Retail Liquidity Programs empirically suggest order-by-order auctions would attract few bidders in less liquid stocks and low-liquidity periods.
The Effects Of Shilling On Final Bid Prices In Online Auctions, Robert J. Kauffman, Charles A. Wood
The Effects Of Shilling On Final Bid Prices In Online Auctions, Robert J. Kauffman, Charles A. Wood
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
An increasing number of reports of online auction fraud are of growing concern to auction operators and participants. In this research, we discuss reserve price shilling, where a bidder shills in order to avoid paying auction house fees, rather than to drive up the price of the final bid. We examine the effect that premium bids have upon the final selling price, since they are linked with reserve price shill bids. We use 10,260 eBay auctions during April 2001, and identify 919 auctions involving 322 sellers and 1583 bidders involved in concurrent auctions for the exact same item. We find …
Auctions For Transferable Objects: Theory And Evidence From The Vehicle Quota System In Singapore, David K. C. Lee, Winston T. H. Koh
Auctions For Transferable Objects: Theory And Evidence From The Vehicle Quota System In Singapore, David K. C. Lee, Winston T. H. Koh
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper studies the hypothesis that auctions with resale markets result in higher prices. The vehicle quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990 provides the setting. The Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) necessary to purchase new cars were initially transferable for all quota categories. After October 1991, COEs for four major categories became non-transferable. Our results indicate that while the conversion to non-transferability eliminated speculation, it has also intensified competition among car distributors. Auctions for non-transferable COEs in fact led to higher COE prices in three of the four categories.