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Full-Text Articles in Business

Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim Apr 2021

Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The growing population in cities and booming e-commerce activities create huge demand for urban last-mile delivery, exerting intense pressure on the cities' well-being. To keep congestion and pollution under control, a consolidator can operate an urban consolidation center (UCC) to bundle shipments from multiple carriers before the last-mile delivery. Alternatively, the consolidator can operate a peer-to-peer platform for the carriers to share delivery capacity. We provide guidance for the consolidator to choose between these two business models by comparative analysis. We capture the interactions between the consolidator and carriers using a game-theoretical framework. Under each business model, the consolidator first …


Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim Dec 2019

Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Booming e-commerce activities further increase this demand, exerting intense pressure on the cities' well-being. To build a city with congestion and pollution under control, a consolidator can operate an urban consolidation center (UCC) to bundle shipments from multiple carriers before the last-mile delivery. Alternatively, the consolidator can operate a peer-to-peer platform for the carriers to share their delivery capacity. Our objective is to compare the performance of these two business models. Under each business model, we study the interactions between a consolidator and multiple carriers using a two-period game-theoretical model. In each period, the consolidator first chooses a delivery fee …


Installed Base Management Versus Selling In Monopolistic And Competitive Environments, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Andreas Robotis, Wassenhove Luk N. V. Van Mar 2019

Installed Base Management Versus Selling In Monopolistic And Competitive Environments, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Andreas Robotis, Wassenhove Luk N. V. Van

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper compares the policy of selling a product to that of installed base management, in which the manufacturer leases the product to consumers, and bundles repair and maintenance services along with the product. We compare the two policies in a monopolistic setting when a firm uses either one of the policies, and when both policies are used by a single firm. We then compare the policies under competition first when two firms use identical products, and when two firms use vertically differentiated products. Our findings indicate that the selling option dominates the installed base option in a monopolistic environment, …


A Model Of Competition Between Perpetual Software And Software As A Service, Zhiling Guo, Dan Ma Mar 2018

A Model Of Competition Between Perpetual Software And Software As A Service, Zhiling Guo, Dan Ma

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

Duplicate record, see https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3744/. Software as a service (SaaS) has grown to be a significant segment of many software product markets. SaaS vendors, which charge customers based on use and continuously improve the quality of their products, have put competitive pressure on traditional perpetual software vendors, which charge a licensing fee and periodically upgrade the quality of their software. We develop an analytical model to study the competitive pricing strategies of an incumbent perpetual software vendor in the presence of a SaaS competitor. We find that, depending on both the SaaS quality improvement rate and the network effect, the …


A Model Of Competition Between Perpetual Software And Software As A Service, Zhiling Guo, Dan Ma Mar 2018

A Model Of Competition Between Perpetual Software And Software As A Service, Zhiling Guo, Dan Ma

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

Software as a service (SaaS) has grown to be a significant segment of many software product markets. SaaS vendors, which charge customers based on use and continuously improve the quality of their products, have put competitive pressure on traditional perpetual software vendors, which charge a licensing fee and periodically upgrade the quality of their software. We develop an analytical model to study the competitive pricing strategies of an incumbent perpetual software vendor in the presence of a SaaS competitor. We find that, depending on both the SaaS quality improvement rate and the network effect, the perpetual software vendor adopts one …


Production Cost Heterogeneity In A Circular-City Model, Mei Lin, Ruhai Wu Jul 2015

Production Cost Heterogeneity In A Circular-City Model, Mei Lin, Ruhai Wu

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

We derive the closed-form solution characterizing the equilibrium in a circular-city model with competing firms of heterogeneous production costs. Tractability issues in this setting are well known and have not been resolved in prior work. In this paper, the equilibrium solution illustrates effects of production costs on firms’ strategic decisions, their aggregate profit, and consumer surplus.


Consignment Contracts With Revenue Sharing For A Capacitated Retailer And Multiple Manufacturers, Yun Fong Lim, Yunzeng Wang, Yue Wu Jun 2015

Consignment Contracts With Revenue Sharing For A Capacitated Retailer And Multiple Manufacturers, Yun Fong Lim, Yunzeng Wang, Yue Wu

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We consider a retailer with limited storage capacity selling n independent products. Each product is produced by a distinct manufacturer, who is offered a consignment contract with revenue sharing by the retailer. The retailer first sets a common revenue share for all products, and each manufacturer then determines the retail price and production quantity for his product. Under certain conditions on price elasticities and cost fractions, we find a unique optimal revenue share for all products. Surprisingly, it is optimal for the retailer not to charge any storage fee in many situations even if she is allowed to do so. …


Combating Strategic Counterfeiters In Licit And Illicit Supply Chains, Soo-Haeng Cho, Xin Fang, Sridhar Tayur Apr 2015

Combating Strategic Counterfeiters In Licit And Illicit Supply Chains, Soo-Haeng Cho, Xin Fang, Sridhar Tayur

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Counterfeit goods are becoming more sophisticated, from shoes to infant milk powder to aircraft parts, creating problems for consumers, firms, and governments. By comparing two types of counterfeiters—deceptive, so infiltrating a licit (but complicit) distributor, or nondeceptive in an illicit channel—we provide insights into the impact of anticounterfeiting strategies on a brand-name company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis highlights that the effectiveness of these strategies depends critically on whether a brand-name company faces a nondeceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. For example, by improving quality, the brand-name company can improve her expected profit against a nondeceptive counterfeiter when the counterfeiter steals …


Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis Of The Selling And Pay-Per-Use Mechanisms, Sridhar Balasubramanian, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vish V. Krishnan Mar 2015

Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis Of The Selling And Pay-Per-Use Mechanisms, Sridhar Balasubramanian, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vish V. Krishnan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods. These mechanisms are selling, where up-front payment allows unrestricted use, and pay-per-use, where payments are tailored to use. We analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay-per-use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known "ticking meter" effect. We demonstrate that pay-per-use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low. In a duopoly, one firm uses selling and the other uses pay-per-use. Here, in contrast to the monopoly, selling yields higher profits than pay-per-use. We demonstrate that, …


Push Or Pull? A Website's Strategic Choice Of Content Delivery Mechanism, Dan Ma Jan 2015

Push Or Pull? A Website's Strategic Choice Of Content Delivery Mechanism, Dan Ma

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

Really simple syndication (RSS) technology enables an alternative delivery mechanism for online content. Instead of waiting passively for users to pull online content out, websites can push it to potential users through RSS. This is expected to significantly affect user behavior, website profitability, and market equilibrium. This research uses an economic model to study the impact of RSS adoption and examine whether it increases a website’s profit and competitive advantage. The findings are intriguing: they demonstrate that RSS can either increase or decrease website profit. In a competitive context, RSS adoption can actually be a disadvantage; in some cases, it …


Vertical Differentiation And A Comparison Of Online Advertising Models, Mei Lin, Xuqing Ke, Andrew B. Whinston Jun 2012

Vertical Differentiation And A Comparison Of Online Advertising Models, Mei Lin, Xuqing Ke, Andrew B. Whinston

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

Designing business models that take into consideration the role of advertising support is critical to the success of online services. In this paper, we address the challenges of these business model strategies and compare different ad revenue models. We use game theory to model vertical differentiation in both monopoly and duopoly settings, in which online service providers may offer an ad-free service, an ad-supported service, or a combination of these services. Offering both ad-free and ad-supported services is the optimal strategy for a monopolist because ad revenues compensate for the cannibalistic effect of vertical differentiation. In a duopoly equilibrium, exactly …


Consolidating Or Non-Consolidating Queues: A Game Theoretic Queuing Model With Holding Costs, Kwan Eng Wee, Ananth Iyer Jan 2011

Consolidating Or Non-Consolidating Queues: A Game Theoretic Queuing Model With Holding Costs, Kwan Eng Wee, Ananth Iyer

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We consider a two-server queueing system in which the servers choose their service rate based on the demand and holding cost allocation scheme offered by the demand generating entity. We provide an optimal holding cost allocation scheme that leads to the maximum possible service rate for each of a pooled and a split system. Our results suggest that careful allocation of holding costs can create incentives that enable minimum turnaround times using a common queue.


Open Innovation In Platform Competition, Mei Lin May 2010

Open Innovation In Platform Competition, Mei Lin

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

We examine the competition between a proprietary platform and an open platform,where each platform holds a two-sided market consisted of app developers and users.The open platform cultivates an innovative environment by inviting public efforts todevelop the platform itself and permitting distribution of apps outside of its own appmarket; the proprietary platform restricts apps sales solely within its app market. Weuse a game theoretic model to capture this competitive phenomenon and analyze theimpact of growth of the open source community on the platform competition. We foundthat growth of the open community mitigates the platform rivalry, and balances the developernetwork sizes on …


Managing Supply Uncertainty With An Information Market, Zhiling Guo, Fang Fang, Andrew B. Whinston Dec 2009

Managing Supply Uncertainty With An Information Market, Zhiling Guo, Fang Fang, Andrew B. Whinston

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

We propose a market-based information aggregation mechanism to manage the supply side uncertainty in the supply chain. In our analytical model, a simple supply chain consists of a group of retailers who order a homogeneous product from two suppliers. The two suppliers differ in their ability to fulfill orders – one always delivers orders and the other fulfills orders probabilistically. We model the supply chain decisions as a Stackelberg game where the supplier who has uncertain reliability decides a wholesale price before the retailers who independently receive signals about the supplier’s reliability determine their sourcing strategies. We then propose an …