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Full-Text Articles in Business

Independent Directors' Dissensions And Firm Value, Wonseok Choi, Monika K. Rabarison, Bin Wang May 2021

Independent Directors' Dissensions And Firm Value, Wonseok Choi, Monika K. Rabarison, Bin Wang

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

Using a novel dataset of independent directors’ voting activities on items proposed by managers of Korean firms, we investigate whether independent directors’ dissension in board meetings plays an effective role in enhancing firm value through improved corporate governance. Our results indicate that dissension improves firm value. This finding is robust to different measures of firm value and alternative model specifications including subsample, propensity score matching, and instrumental variable analyses. Overall, we contribute to the understanding of the relation between corporate governance and firm value. Specifically, we provide new evidence that the monitoring by independent directors enhances firm value.


Board Demography And Divestitures: The Impact Of Gender And Racial Diversity On Divestiture Rate And Divestiture Returns, Kalin Kolev, Gerry Mcnamara Apr 2020

Board Demography And Divestitures: The Impact Of Gender And Racial Diversity On Divestiture Rate And Divestiture Returns, Kalin Kolev, Gerry Mcnamara

Management Faculty Research and Publications

Drawing on resource dependence theory and group diversity research, this paper examines how board gender and racial diversity impact corporate divestitures. We argue that due to the diverse experiences, knowledge, and perspectives that female and racial minority directors bring to the boardroom, it is more difficult and time-consuming for the board to reach a consensus and pursue a common course of action. Consistent with this argument, our results indicate that board gender and racial diversity lead to longer divestiture completion times and a lower divestiture rate. Additionally, we argue that due to their cognitive heterogeneity, diverse boards likely exchange a …


The Discretionary Effect Of Ceos And Board Chairs On Corporate Governance Structures, Matteo P. Arena, Marcus V. Braga-Alves Mar 2013

The Discretionary Effect Of Ceos And Board Chairs On Corporate Governance Structures, Matteo P. Arena, Marcus V. Braga-Alves

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance. We find that CEO and board chair fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in board size, board independence, and CEO-chair duality even after controlling for several firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. The effect of CEOs on corporate governance practices is attributable mainly to executives who simultaneously hold the position of CEO and board chair in the same firm. Our results do not show a decline in CEO discretionary influence on corporate governance after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and stock exchange …


When Managers Bypass Shareholder Approval Of Board Appointments: Evidence From The Private Security Market, Matteo Arena, Stephen P. Ferris Sep 2007

When Managers Bypass Shareholder Approval Of Board Appointments: Evidence From The Private Security Market, Matteo Arena, Stephen P. Ferris

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

This paper investigates the influence of managerial entrenchment on private placements by examining the firm's decision to appoint representatives of the private investors to the board without shareholder approval. By analyzing a sample of U.S. firms that appoint directors in combination with private offerings between 1995 and 2000, we find that firms with greater managerial entrenchment are more likely to bypass shareholder approval. Firms that bypass shareholders are less likely to appoint independent directors or to elect one of these directors as chairman. We also show that the market reacts more positively to the private offering announcement when the firm …