Business Commons^™

Investor Behavior In The Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence From Gross Flows, George D. Cashman, Federico Nardari, Daniel N. Deli, Sriram V. Villupuram

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

Using a large sample of monthly gross flows from 1997 to 2003, we uncover several previously undocumented regularities in investor behavior. First, investor purchases and sales produce fund-level gross flows that are highly persistent. Persistence in fund flows dominates performance as a predictor of future fund flows. More importantly, failing to account for flow persistence leads to incorrect inferences with respect to the relation between performance and flows. Second, we document that investors react differently to performance depending on the type of fund, and that investor trading activity produces meaningful differences in the persistence of fund flows across mutual fund …

Convenience In The Mutual Fund Industry, George D. Cashman

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

Abstract

I examine the role of convenience in the mutual fund industry. I find that investors pay more for relatively convenient funds, and that the flows to convenient funds are less responsive to performance. These findings suggest that investors do not evaluate mutual funds independently, but rather that investors select a primary fund, likely based on beliefs about managerial ability, and then select funds which are relatively convenient to this primary fund.

Highlights

► I find that investors pay a significant premium to invest in convenient mutual funds. ► I find that the flows to convenient funds are indifferent to …

Pay-Performance Sensitivity And Firm Size: Insights From The Mutual Fund Industry, George D. Cashman

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to …