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Information Leakage And Stackelberg Leadership In Cournot Competition, Huajiang Luo
Information Leakage And Stackelberg Leadership In Cournot Competition, Huajiang Luo
Theses & Dissertations
In duopoly Cournot competition with sequential moves, it is well known that each player prefers Stackelberg leadership without demand uncertainty. We study the same game when the demand is uncertain, and firms possess some private information about the uncertain demand. There are two effects of private information in this game. First, when the Stackelberg leader moves first, its private information is leaked to, or inferred by the Stackelberg follower via the output quantity. Hence, the Stackelberg follower makes decision based on more accurate information than the leader. Second, the leader incurs a cost to signal its information to the follower, …