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Full-Text Articles in Business
Venture Capitalists And Closely Held Ipos: Lessons For Family-Controlled Firms, Joseph H. Astrachan, Daniel L. Mcconaughy
Venture Capitalists And Closely Held Ipos: Lessons For Family-Controlled Firms, Joseph H. Astrachan, Daniel L. Mcconaughy
Faculty and Research Publications
This study examines how the presence of venture capitalists (VCs) in closely held IPOs relates to their performance. It also identifies other factors that are related to the performance of closely held IPOs. Closely held firms in this study had an average of 88% insider ownership before the IPO. In general, we find that closely held IPOs benefit from associations with VCs. This finding suggests that VCs' outside expertise and connections are valuable assets. Because it takes time for VCs to effect changes and because beneficial changes generally occur gradually, firms contemplating IPOs must plan well in advance to maximize …
Top 10 Audit Deficiencies, Mark S. Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. Hermanson
Top 10 Audit Deficiencies, Mark S. Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. Hermanson
Faculty and Research Publications
The article focuses on financial statement fraud based on cases wherein the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission sanctioned auditors for their association with fraudulent financial statements. All of the cases involved public companies, most of which engaged ill fraudulent financial reporting. Only a few engaged in misappropriation of assets or defalcation. The most common problem, alleged in 90% of the cases, was the auditor's failure to gather sufficient evidence. In some instances, this failure was pervasive throughout the engagement while in other instances the allegations were more specific. For example, many of the cases involved inadequate evidence in the areas …
New Evidence On The Structuring Of Ceo Incentive Pay Ratios, Rajaram Veliyath, James J. Cordeiro
New Evidence On The Structuring Of Ceo Incentive Pay Ratios, Rajaram Veliyath, James J. Cordeiro
Faculty and Research Publications
The model examines both determinants of CEO incentive pay ratios that are controllable by the CEO, and those that are less controllable, based on a sample of 316 Fortune 500 firms in 1992. Firm diversity, firm growth opportunities, outside blockholdings, and the number of analysts following the firm were positively related to CEO incentive compensation ratios, while firm unsystematic risk, CEO stockholdings, and industry regulation had a negative impact. Finally, industry-specific influences were evident on incentive compensation ratios.