Business Commons^™

Deterrence Theory: Key Findings And Challenges, Alex Raskolnikov

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter reviews the key findings of the optimal deterrence theory and discusses the remaining challenges. Some of these challenges reflect current modeling choices and limitations. These include the treatment of the offender’s gains in the social welfare function; the design of the damages multiplier in a realistic, multi-period framework; the effects of different types of uncertainty on behavior; and the study of optional, imperfectly enforced, threshold-based regimes – that is, regimes that reflect the most common real-world regulatory setting. Other challenges arise because several key regulatory features and enforcement outcomes are inconsistent with the deterrence theory’s predictions and prescriptions. …

Federal Corporate Law And The Business Of Banking, Lev Menand, Morgan Ricks

Faculty Scholarship

The only profit-seeking business enterprises chartered by a federal government agency are banks. Yet there is barely any scholarship justifying this exception to state primacy in U.S. corporate law.

This Article addresses that gap. It reinterprets the National Bank Act (NBA) – the organic statute governing national banks, the heavyweights of the financial sector – as a corporation law and recovers the reasons why Congress wrote this law: not to catalyze private wealth creation or to regulate an existing industry, but to solve an economic governance problem. National banks are federal instrumentalities charged with augmenting the money supply – a …

Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.

We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding …

Dark Trading At The Midpoint: Does Sec Enforcement Policy Encourage Direct Feed Arbitrage?, Robert P. Bartlett Iii, Justin Mccrary

Faculty Scholarship

Prevailing research in market microstructure posits that liquidity providers bypass queue lines on exchanges by offering liquidity in dark venues with de minimis sub-penny price improvement, thus exploiting an exception to the penny quote rule. We show that (a) the SEC enforces the quote rule to prevent sub-penny queuejumping in dark pools unless trades are “pegged” to the NBBO midpoint and (b) the documented increase in dark trading due to investor queue-jumping stems from increased midpoint trading. Although encouraging pegged midpoint orders can subject traders to direct feed arbitrage, we estimate that less than 2% of shares traded per year …

Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks?, Ariel Porat, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the dramatic increase in business networks in recent decades and considers whether the law can play a useful role in supporting the efficient functioning of these inter-firm relationships for coordination and cooperation. Repeat play, reputational sanctions, and norms of trust and reciprocity are the common explanations for the flourishing of networks in many industries and places. But the evidence also shows that a certain class of networks often fails to survive or function effectively and beneficial cooperation among these network members is impaired. These fragile networks develop organically without a controlling party or hierarchy at the center …

Amazon – An Infrastructure Service And Its Challenge To Current Antitrust Law, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter maps out facets of Amazon’s power. In particular, it traces the sources of Amazon’s growth and analyzes the potential effects of its dominance. Doing so enables us to make sense of the company’s business strategy and illuminates anticompetitive aspects of its structure and conduct. This analysis reveals that the current framework in antitrust — specifically its equating competition with “consumer welfare,” typically measured through short- term effects on price and output — fails to capture the architecture of market power in the 21st- century marketplace. In other words, the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance are …

Naked Open Market Manipulation And Its Effects, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

More than 80 years after US federal law first addressed stock market manipulation, there is still dispute about manipulation law’s foundational principles; this chapter aims to provide clarity by offering an analytical framework for understanding a specific manipulation. There has been a sharp split among the federal circuits concerning manipulation law’s central question: Can trading activity alone ever be considered illegal manipulation? Economists and legal scholars do not agree on whether manipulation is possible in principle, let alone on how to address it properly in practice. The framework offered by this chapter aims to help clarify federal law and may …

Appraisal Arbitrage And Shareholder Value, Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Post-merger appraisal rights have been the focus of heated controversy within mergers and acquisitions circles in recent years. Traditionally perceived as an arcane and cabalistic proceeding, the appraisal action has recently come to occupy center stage through the ascendancy of appraisal arbitrage — whereby investors purchase target-company shares shortly after an announcement principally to pursue appraisal. Such strategies became more feasible and profitable a decade ago, on the heels of two seemingly technocratic reforms in Delaware: (i) the statutory codification of pre-judgment interest, pegging a presumptive rate at five percent above the federal discount rate; and (ii) the Transkaryotic opinion, …

Third-Party Beneficiaries And Contractual Networks, Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

An increasing trend of economic agents is to form productive associations such as networks, platforms, and other hybrids. Subsets of these agents contract with each other to further their network project and these contracts can create benefits for, or impose costs on, agents who are not contract parties. Contract law regulates third party claims against contract parties with the third-party beneficiary doctrine, which directs courts to ask whether the contracting parties "intended" to benefit a particular third party. We show here what courts do with third party claims when network members fail to perform for third parties and what the …

Transnational Regulatory Regimes In Finance: A Comparative Analysis Of Their (Dis-)Integrative Effects, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

Financial markets have become increasingly interconnected with financial intermediaries and instruments linking local and national markets to form regional or even global ones. The global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated once more that financial interdependence can be both a blessing and a curse. It facilitates the movement of capital and the expansion of credit, and as such promotes economic development in good times; however, in bad times it transmits liquidity shortages throughout the system triggering financial crises and economic recessions where credit expansion earlier fuelled expansion and growth. A critical question therefore is how to structure the governance of transnational …

Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, The Evidence, And The Enduring Tension Between "Lumpers" And "Splitters", John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This article argues that dispersed ownership resulted less from inexorable forces and more from private ordering. Neither legal nor political conditions mandated or prevented the appearance of dispersed ownership. Rather, entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and investors — all seeking to maximize value — sometimes saw reasons why selling control into the public market would maximize value for them. But when and why? That is the article's focus. It argues that law played less of a role than specialized intermediaries — investment banks, securities exchanges, and other agents — who found it to be in their self-interest to foster dispersed ownership and …

Public Ownership. Firm Governance, And Litigation Risk, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Many going-private transactions are motivated – at least ostensibly – by the desire to escape the burdens and costs of public ownership. Although these burdens have many purported manifestations, one commonly cited is the risk of litigation, which may be borne both directly by the firm and/or its fiduciaries or reflected in director and officer insurance premia funded at company expense. An important issue for the "litigation risk" justification of privatization is whether alternative (and less expensive) steps falling short of going private – such as governance reforms – may augur sufficiently against litigation exposure. In this Article, I consider …

On Public Versus Private Provision Of Corporate Law, Gillian K. Hadfield, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Law in modern market societies serves both democratic and economic functions. In its economic function, law is a service, a means of enhancing the value of transactions and organizations. Yet modern market economies continue to rely on the state, rather than the market, to provide this service. This paper investigates whether private provision of law may be superior to public provision. We look in particular at corporate law, where there is a substantial literature exploring the efficiency implications of "regulatory competition" and compare this competition with market competition between private providers. Drawing from the well-known framework of spatial models of …

Controlling Controlling Shareholders, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The rules governing controlling shareholders sit at the intersection of the two facets of the agency problem at the core of public corporations law. The first is the familiar principal-agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control. With only this facet in mind, a large shareholder may better police management than the standard panoply of market-oriented techniques. The second is the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, which produces the potential for private benefits of control. There is, however, a point of tangency between these facets. Because there are costs associated with holding a …

Toward The Feminization Of Collective Bargaining Law, Gillian L. Lester

Faculty Scholarship

Canadian collective bargaining law is flawed because it fails to address the concerns of a substantial segment of the work force and overlooks women as a rich source of insight into the dynamics of the bargaining environment. The author begins by exploring the problems inherent in the classical contractualist model, arguing that current collective bargaining law reflects these weaknesses and echoes a morality and ideology which are stereotypically masculine. By analyzing the legal and practical structures of collective bargaining, the author illustrates the ways in which the "morality of the workplace" is manifested differently between men and women. The author …

Just Say No To Whom?, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

"Just say no" is the current rallying cry of those seeking to give target management the unrestricted power to block hostile tender offers. Not surprisingly, the turn of phrase chosen by management leaves ambiguous the precise issue on which the debate should turn: To whom does management want the power to say no? As target management poses the issue, it wants to say no to a raider. The image is of stalwart management protecting shareholders against a marauding outsider. However, that image is seriously misleading. In fact, target management seeks the power to say no to its own shareholders.

The …

What Triggers Revlon?, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Delaware's new approach to takeover law is announced in three cases that address different aspects of management's role in the standard drama of defending against a hostile takeover. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. scripts a main act for the drama by prescribing a duty to compare the outsider's offer with the universe of other options and, if necessary, to resist the outsider within the guidelines fixed by the proportionality test. Moran v. Household International, Inc. writes a prologue by encouraging management to plan a vigorous defense that can thwart a coercive offer without damaging the company. Finally, Revlon …

Are We A Nation Of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence On Tax Compliance, Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Louis L. Wilde

Faculty Scholarship

In 1982, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Roscoe Egger reported to Congress that legal sector noncompliance with the Federal Income Tax statutes generated an "income tax gap" of $81 billion in 1981, up from $29 billion in 1973. He further projected a gap of $120 billion for 1985 (U.S. Congress, 1982). Perceptions of accelerating noncompliance inspired a crisis mentality within the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, and the tax bar.

The IRS responded in part by funding a major independent study of tax noncompliance via the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Bar Foundation initiated an investigation of its own …