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An Investigation Of Voluntary Discovery And Disclosure Of Environmental Violations Using Laboratory Experiments, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund
An Investigation Of Voluntary Discovery And Disclosure Of Environmental Violations Using Laboratory Experiments, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test individual responses to policies that seek to encourage firms to voluntarily discover and disclose violations of environmental standards. We find that while it is possible to motivate a significant number of voluntary disclosures without adversely affecting environmental quality, this result is sensitive to both the fine for disclosed violations and the assumption that firms know their compliance status without cost. When firms have to expend resources to determine their compliance status, motivating a significant number of violation disclosures yields worse environmental quality. Finally, relative to conventional enforcement, disclosure polices will result in more …
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence From The Field, Maria Alejandra Vélez, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence From The Field, Maria Alejandra Vélez, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
John K. Stranlund
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism. We test whether an econometric summary of subjects’ strategies is consistent with one of these motivations using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia. As expected, average extraction levels are less than that predicted by a model of pure self-interest, but are nevertheless sub-optimal. Moreover, we find that a model of conformism …
Inspections To Avert Terrorism: Robustness Under Severe Uncertainty, Joe L. Moffitt, John K. Stranlund, Barry C. Field
Inspections To Avert Terrorism: Robustness Under Severe Uncertainty, Joe L. Moffitt, John K. Stranlund, Barry C. Field
John K. Stranlund
Protecting against terrorist attacks requires making decisions in a world in which attack probabilities are largely unknown. The potential for very large losses encourages a conservative perspective, in particular toward decisions that are robust. But robustness, in the sense of assurance against extreme outcomes, ordinarily is not the only desideratum in uncertain environments. We adopt Yakov Ben-Haim’s (2001b) model of information gap decision making to investigate the problem of inspecting a number of similar targets when one of the targets may be attacked, but with unknown probability. We apply this to a problem of inspecting a sample of incoming shipping …
A Laboratory Investigation Of Compliance Behavior Under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications For Targeted Enforcement, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
A Laboratory Investigation Of Compliance Behavior Under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications For Targeted Enforcement, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
John K. Stranlund
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the theoretical observations that both the violations of competitive risk-neutral firms and the marginal effectiveness of increased enforcement across firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of permits. This conclusion has important implications for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that regulators have no justification for targeting their enforcement effort based on firm-level characteristics. Consistent with the theory, we find that subjects’ violations were independent of parametric differences in their abatement costs. However, those subjects that were predicted to buy permits tended to have higher violation …