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Managerial Entrenchment And Payout Policy: A Catering Effect, Daniel Gyimah, Ernest Gyapong
Managerial Entrenchment And Payout Policy: A Catering Effect, Daniel Gyimah, Ernest Gyapong
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© 2020 Elsevier Inc. Agency theory suggests that entrenched managers are less likely to pay dividends. However, according to the catering theory, external pressures from investors can force managers to increase dividend payments. Hence, we test whether entrenched managers respond to investor demand for dividends and share repurchases. Using a large sample of 9677 US firms over the period 1990–2016 (i.e. a total of 80,478 firm-year observations), we test and find evidence that managerial entrenchment negatively impacts dividend payments. Our findings suggest that catering effects weaken the negative impact of managerial entrenchment on payout policy and that in firms with …