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Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
In this paper, we examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence are effective in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors prior to the reforms (referred to as non-compliance firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that overall, compared to the other firms, noncompliance firms do not experience a significant decrease in the extent of earnings management from prior to the reforms to afterwards. However, we find that non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management compared with the other firms. The results …
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence reduce the extent of earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors before the reforms (referred to as noncompliant firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that, while noncompliant firms on average do not experience a significant decrease in earnings management after the reforms compared to other firms, noncompliant firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management. The results are similar when we examine audit committee independence and when we use alternative proxies for information acquisition cost and …
Institutional Change Versus Resilience: A Study Of An Incorporation Of Independent Directors In Singapore Banks, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Toru Yoshikawa
Institutional Change Versus Resilience: A Study Of An Incorporation Of Independent Directors In Singapore Banks, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Toru Yoshikawa
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We examine how Anglo-American capital market logic penetrated into Singapore where relational logic tends to guide business activities and illustrate how domestic banks reacted to this imported logic in the corporate governance field. We argue that the banks’ ability to accommodate competing logics was enhanced by state agencies’ willingness to modify Anglo-American standards to fit the local context. Given the resulting institutional ambiguities in rules, local banks, while incorporating higher outside representation on their boards, reinterpreted the meaning of independence and emphasized the resource provision role rather than the monitoring function of outside directors. The resultant institutional change has been …
The Interaction Effects Of Ceo Power, Social Connections And Incentive Compensation On Firm Value, Gary Caton, Choo Yong, Jeremy Goh, Jinghao Ke, Scott C. Linn
The Interaction Effects Of Ceo Power, Social Connections And Incentive Compensation On Firm Value, Gary Caton, Choo Yong, Jeremy Goh, Jinghao Ke, Scott C. Linn
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We study the relation between company value and the interplay between CEO power, CEO equity incentives and the friendliness of the board of directors. Following Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011), we measure CEO power as the proportion paid to the CEO of the total compensation paid to the top five executives of the firm. We find that strong CEO equity incentives and the presence of a friendly board of directors both individually moderate the negative effect of CEO power on Tobin’s q. Moreover, these variables also work together. We find that firm value tends to increase when equity incentives are …