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Full-Text Articles in Business

Family Firm Research: A Review, Qiang Cheng Sep 2014

Family Firm Research: A Review, Qiang Cheng

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This article reviews family firm studies in the finance and accounting literature, primarily those conducted using data from the United States and China. Family owners have unique features such as concentrated ownership, long investment horizon, and reputation concerns. Given the distinguishing features of family ownership and control, family firms face unique agency conflicts. We discuss the agency problems in family firms and review the findings of recent family firm studies. We call for more research to understand the unique family effects and encourage more research on Chinese family firms. Part I of the article discusses the fundaments of family firms: …


Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market: Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms?, Jerry X. Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary G. Tian Sep 2014

Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market: Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms?, Jerry X. Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary G. Tian

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper investigates venture capitalists’ monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems have a greater impact on …