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Political Connections As An Agreement Device, Xiaping Jerry Cao, Sheng Huang, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian Feb 2014

Political Connections As An Agreement Device, Xiaping Jerry Cao, Sheng Huang, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

No abstract provided.


Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian Feb 2014

Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

This paper examines the interactive effect of private equity (PE) and ultimate owners on the process of firms' going public. We find that firms with high excess control rights have more earnings management before IPO, and they are more likely to seek PE investors especially when the earnings management are high. We further show that the involvement of PE investors increases the probability of the firms' IPO application being approved by the regulators in firms with high excess control rights. However, the PE-backed firms with high excess control rights are found to have higher IPO fee, lower initial returns and …


Political Connections As An Agreement Device, Xiaping Jerry Cao, Sheng Huang, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian Jan 2014

Political Connections As An Agreement Device, Xiaping Jerry Cao, Sheng Huang, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

No abstract provided.


Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian Jan 2014

Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

This paper examines the interactive effect of private equity (PE) and ultimate owners on the process of firms' going public. We find that firms with high excess control rights have more earnings management before IPO, and they are more likely to seek PE investors especially when the earnings management are high. We further show that the involvement of PE investors increases the probability of the firms' IPO application being approved by the regulators in firms with high excess control rights. However, the PE-backed firms with high excess control rights are found to have higher IPO fee, lower initial returns and …


The Value Of Political Connections When Accessing The Ipo Market, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Tian Jan 2014

The Value Of Political Connections When Accessing The Ipo Market, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

In this study we examined the value of political connections in firms' access to the IPO market using a sample of Chinese IPO applications from 2006 to 2010. We found a positive relationship between political connections and the probability of IPO approval, and this relationship is strengthened in entrepreneurial firms and weakened in those firms controlled by the state. We further provide evidence that entrepreneurial firms with a disproportional ownership structure and without high technology benefit more from political connections. Our additional tests showed that entrepreneurial (state) firms with political connections also performed better (worse) than firms without. We argue …