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Research And Development Project Valuation And Licensing Negotiations At Phytopharm Plc, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve, Wang Chong Aug 2011

Research And Development Project Valuation And Licensing Negotiations At Phytopharm Plc, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve, Wang Chong

Zeger Degraeve

We describe a research and development project-valuation model developed for Phytopharm plc, a pharmaceutical development and functional food company based in Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom. Phytopharm uses the model to value the projects in its research and development portfolio, and in licensing negotiations with potential product development and marketing partners. We include different valuation methods, including net present value, decision analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation. We also consider the technological risks of product development, as well as the uncertainty of commercial success. In addition to determining a value for a product in development, the model proposes appropriate licensing contract structures. A …


Milestone Payments Or Royalties? Contract Design For R&D Licensing, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve Aug 2011

Milestone Payments Or Royalties? Contract Design For R&D Licensing, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve

Zeger Degraeve

We study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee's valuation of the innovation, and limited control over the licensee's development efforts. A licensing contract typically contains an up-front payment, milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase, and royalties on sales. We use principal-agent models to formulate the licensor's contracting problem, and we find that under adverse selection, the optimal contract structure changes with the licensee's valuation of the innovation. As the licensee's valuation increases, the licensor's optimal level of involvement in the development-directly or through royalties-should decrease. Only a risk-averse …