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Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Chris Horan, Philip Smith Dec 2012

Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Chris Horan, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables - regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness - interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators …


Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns Dec 2012

Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns

Mara Olekalns

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables - regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness - interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators …


Negotiating The Gender Divide: Lessons From The Negotiation And Organizational Behavior Literatures, Carol Kulik, Mara Olekalns Dec 2011

Negotiating The Gender Divide: Lessons From The Negotiation And Organizational Behavior Literatures, Carol Kulik, Mara Olekalns

Mara Olekalns

Employment relationships are increasingly personalized, with more employment conditions open to negotiation. Although the intended goal of this personalization is a better and more satisfying employment relationship, personalization may systematically disadvantage members of some demographic groups. This disadvantage is evident for women, who routinely negotiate less desirable employment terms than men. This gender-based gap in outcomes is frequently attributed to differences in the ways that men and women negotiate. We review the negotiation research demonstrating that women are systematically disadvantaged in negotiations and the organizational behavior research examining the backlash experienced by agentic women. We use the Stereotype Content Model …


Interpretive Filters: Social Cognition And The Impact Of Turning Points In Negotiation, Dan Druckman, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2008

Interpretive Filters: Social Cognition And The Impact Of Turning Points In Negotiation, Dan Druckman, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

A number of studies have shown that certain events that occur during a negotiation can alter its course. Referred to as "turning points," these events are precipitated by actions taken either outside or inside the talks that have consequences for outcomes. In this article, we report the results of two experiments designed to examine the impacts of two types of precipitating actions, external and internal. In the first experiment, which focused on external actions, we found that crises — as opposed to breakthroughs — produced more movement in negotiations in which parties viewed the social climate positively (high trust, low …


Mutually Dependent: Power, Trust, Affect And The Use Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2008

Mutually Dependent: Power, Trust, Affect And The Use Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in …


Competent And Likeable? Protecting And Promoting Women’S Likeability In Employment Negotiations, Mara Olekalns, Carol Kulik Dec 2008

Competent And Likeable? Protecting And Promoting Women’S Likeability In Employment Negotiations, Mara Olekalns, Carol Kulik

Mara Olekalns

Professional women earn less than their male counterparts and this salary gap largely results from the ways men and women negotiate employment terms. We integrate the Stereotype Content Model and Expectancy Violation Theory to explain why traditional “best practice” negotiation behaviors benefit male negotiators but backfire for female negotiators. Gender counter-normative behaviors create negative expectancy violations for women, generating cognitive and emotional backlash from their negotiation partners. We use this theoretical integration to identify alternative strategies that female employees and their employers can use to avoid negative expectancy violations and ensure that women are not disadvantaged in workplace negotiations.


Emotion In Negotiation: Introduction To Special Issue, Mara Olekalns, Dan Druckman Dec 2007

Emotion In Negotiation: Introduction To Special Issue, Mara Olekalns, Dan Druckman

Mara Olekalns

This paper is the introduction to a Special Issue of Group Decision and Negotiation, focusing on emotion in negotiation.


Emergent Negotiations: Stability And Shifts In Process Dynamics, Mara Olekalns, Laurie Weingart Dec 2007

Emergent Negotiations: Stability And Shifts In Process Dynamics, Mara Olekalns, Laurie Weingart

Mara Olekalns

Negotiation is a dynamic process in which negotiators change their strategies in response to each other. We believe mutual adaptation is best conceptualized as an emergent process and is a critical determinant of negotiators’ abilities to identify mutually beneficial solutions. We argue that two factors drive the process of negotiation and influence the quality of agreements: alignment of negotiators’ strategies across individuals (strategy sequences) and with the negotiation-wide dynamic (phases) and congruence of negotiators’ goals.


Communication And Conflict, Mara Olekalns, Linda Putnam, Laurie Weingart Dec 2006

Communication And Conflict, Mara Olekalns, Linda Putnam, Laurie Weingart

Mara Olekalns

Communication is central to the experience and management of conflict. It is through communication that people express their desires, realize differences, and attempt to resolve those differences. While there is a rich tradition of research on conflict in organizational settings, the focus on the role communication is more recent. In 1987, Putnam and Poole wrote one of the first reviews of this literature, noting that “communication constitutes the essence of conflict in that it undergirds the formation of opposing issues, frames perceptions of the felt conflict, translates emotions and perceptions into conflict behaviors, and sets the stage for future conflicts” …


Conflicting Social Motives In Negotiating Groups, Laurie Weingart, Jeanne Brett, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2006

Conflicting Social Motives In Negotiating Groups, Laurie Weingart, Jeanne Brett, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Negotiators’ social motives (cooperative versus individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. This study used multi-level modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators’ social motives and the composition of the group influence group members’ negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5 issue mixed-motive decision making task were videotaped, transcribed, and coded. Group composition included two homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and three heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators/1 individualist; 2 cooperators/2 individualists; 1 cooperator/3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social motive composition of the …


Resolving The Empty Core: Trust As A Determinant Of Outcomes In Three-Party Negotiations, Mara Olekalns, Feyona Lau, Philip Smith Dec 2006

Resolving The Empty Core: Trust As A Determinant Of Outcomes In Three-Party Negotiations, Mara Olekalns, Feyona Lau, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

This research examined how trust affected resource allocation in a 3-party negotiation. Negotiators were presented with an empty core problem in which their theoretical share of resources exceeded the resources available for distribution. We tested which of three components of trust – reliability, predictability and empathy – predicted negotiators’ outcomes. We distinguished between absolute and relative trust. We found that relative trust was a more consistent predictor of individual outcomes than absolute trust and that the most trusted party in a network obtained the highest individual outcomes. This finding highlights the importance of social context in shaping trust judgements. The …


Loose With The Truth: Predicting Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2006

Loose With The Truth: Predicting Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic …


Markov Chain Analyses Of Communication Processes In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith, Laurie Weingart Dec 2005

Markov Chain Analyses Of Communication Processes In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith, Laurie Weingart

Mara Olekalns

Markov chain analysis provides a way to investigate how the communication processes in dyadic negotiations are affected by features of the negotiating context and how, in turn, differences in communication processes among dyads affect the quality of the final settlement. In Markov models, the communication process is represented as a sequence of transitions between states, which describes how tactics are used and how they are reciprocated during the course of a negotiation. This article provides an introduction to Markov chain analysis and shows, using simulated data, how Markov chain models may be analyzed using widely-available loglinear modeling software. Model selection, …


Markov Chain Analyses Of Communication Processes In Negotiation, Philip Smith, Mara Olekalns, Laurie Weingart Dec 2004

Markov Chain Analyses Of Communication Processes In Negotiation, Philip Smith, Mara Olekalns, Laurie Weingart

Mara Olekalns

Markov chain analysis provides a way to investigate how the communication processes in dyadic negotiations are affected by features of the negotiating context and how, in turn, differences in communication processes among dyads affect the quality of the final settlement. In Markov models, the communication process is represented as a sequence of transitions between states, which describes how tactics are used and how they are reciprocated during the course of a negotiation. This article provides an introduction to Markov chain analysis and shows, using simulated data, how Markov chain models may be analyzed using widely-available loglinear modeling software. Model selection, …


Moments In Time: Metacognition, Trust And Outcomes In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2004

Moments In Time: Metacognition, Trust And Outcomes In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

This research tested the relationships between turning points, cognitive and affective trust, and negotiation outcomes. After completing a simulated negotiation, participants identified turning points from videotape. Turning points were then classified as substantive (interest, offer), characterization (positive, negative), or procedural (positive, negative). Pre-negotiation affective trust predicted subsequent turning points whereas pre-negotiation cognitive trust did not, suggesting that different cues influence the two types of trust. Post-negotiation cognitive trust was increased by the occurrence of interest, positive characterization, and positive procedural turning points and decreased by negative characterization turning points. Affective trust was increased by positive procedural turning points. Finally, interest …


Quantitative Coding Negotiation Processes, Laurie Weingart, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2004

Quantitative Coding Negotiation Processes, Laurie Weingart, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

The examination of negotiation processes is seen by many researchers as an insurmountable task largely because the required methods are unfamiliar and labor-intensive. In this article, we shed light on a fundamental step in studying negotiation processes, the quantitative coding of data. Relying on videotapes as the primary source of data, we review the steps required to extract usable quantitative data and the lessons we’ve learned in doing so in our own research. We review our experience working with one large negotiation dataset, Towers Market II, to illustrate two steps within the larger research process: developing a coding scheme and …