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Full-Text Articles in Business

European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in fall 2008, each of the 27 member states in the European Union (EU) set many of its own banking rules and had its own bank regulators and supervisors. The crisis made the shortcomings of this decentralized approach obvious, and since its formation in January 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been developing a “Single Rulebook” that will harmonize banking rules across the EU countries. In June 2012, European leaders went even further, committing to a banking union that would better coordinate supervision of banks in the then 18-country Eurozone. A …


European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion And Standing Facilities, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion And Standing Facilities, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Beginning in August 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) responded to market turmoil with a variety of standard and non-standard monetary policy tools. This case discusses the operational framework of the ECB’s open market operation tools and standing facilities before and during the financial crisis. Specifically, this case describes the ECB’s use of its main refinancing and longer-term refinancing operations, the expansion of collateral eligible for use in Eurosystem credit operations, and the ECB’s standing facilities, including its marginal lending and deposit facilities.


Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …


Ireland And Iceland In Crisis B: Decreasing Loan Loss Provisions In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis B: Decreasing Loan Loss Provisions In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

All public companies in the European Union, including Ireland’s major banks, were required to adopt IAS 39 for their annual accounting periods beginning on or after January 1, 2005. Under the “incurred loss” model of IAS 39, banks could set aside reserves for loan losses only when objective evidence existed that a loan was impaired, not in anticipation of future losses. As a result, Irish banks saw their aggregate reserve for bad loans drop from 1.2% of loan balances at the end of 2000 to only 0.4% by 2006-07, just before the collapse of the banking industry caused loan losses …


Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Ireland went from being the poorest member of the European Economic Community in 1973 to enjoying the second highest per-capita income among European countries by 2007. Healthy growth in the 1990s eventually gave way to a concentrated boom in property-related lending in the 2000s. The growth in the aggregate loan balances of Ireland’s six major banks greatly exceeded the growth in gross domestic product (GDP); as a result, bank loan balances grew from 1.1 times GDP in 2000 to over 2.0 times GDP by 2007. Given the small size of the domestic retail depositor base, the Irish banks increasingly funded …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

As a global financial service provider, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in different countries. Bruno Iksil, the derivatives trader primarily responsible for the $6 billion trading loss in 2012, was based in JPM’s London office. This office was regulated both by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States (US) and by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the United Kingdom (UK). Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements with one another to define basic parameters …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used ways to measure and monitor market risk. At JPMorgan Chase (JPM), very large derivative positions established by Bruno Iksil in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) caused the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) to exceed its VaR limit for four days in a row in January 2012. In response, the CIO changed to a new VaR model on January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce VaR by half. However, JPM soon discovered that this new VaR model had not been properly implemented and the bank went back to using the …


Lessons Learned: Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Esq., Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins Mar 2019

Lessons Learned: Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Esq., Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Baxter, who was General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the crisis, gives us his take on how best to prepare for future crises.