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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Business
Se(C)(3): A Catalyst For Social Enterprise Crowdfunding, Dana Brakman Reiser, Steven A. Dean
Se(C)(3): A Catalyst For Social Enterprise Crowdfunding, Dana Brakman Reiser, Steven A. Dean
Indiana Law Journal
The emerging consensus among scholars rejects the notion of tax breaks for social enterprises, concluding that such prizes will attract strategic claimants, ultimately doing more harm than good. The SE(c)(3) regime proposed by this Article offers entrepreneurs and investors committed to combining financial returns and social good with a means of broadcasting that shared resolve. Combining a measured tax benefit for mission-driven activities with a heightened burden on shareholder financial gains, the revenue-neutral SE(c)(3) regime would provide investors and funding platforms with a low-cost means of screening out “greenwashed” ventures.
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Indiana Law Journal
Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view based on an agency problem paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers’ consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is …
Verizon’S “Certification Process” And Why The Fcc Needs To Take A Stand, P. J. Gretter
Verizon’S “Certification Process” And Why The Fcc Needs To Take A Stand, P. J. Gretter
Indiana Law Journal
This Note will give an in-depth review of the legality and policy implications of Verizon’s lengthy certification process. Part I will give a short background of the time leading up to Verizon’s purchase of the C-Block. It will then review the actual rules of the agreement between Verizon and the FCC at the time of the purchase, as well as the pertinent history following the purchase. Part II will analyze whether Verizon’s lengthy certification process violates the C-Block rules or the general spirit of Verizon’s agreement to abide by the rules. Part III will then argue that, even if Verizon’s …
Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment, Adi Ayal, Uri Benoliel
Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment, Adi Ayal, Uri Benoliel
Indiana Law Journal
One of the most vital debates in franchise law focuses on whether state or federal law should adopt “good-cause statutes” (GCSs), which require franchisors to show good cause before terminating contractual relations with a franchisee. The traditional law-and-economics analysis suggests that GCSs are inefficient. This inefficiency argument is based upon one central hypothesis: GCSs increase franchisee free riding since they limit the franchisor’s ability to terminate the franchise contract easily. The free-riding hypothesis has been significantly influential in the development of franchise law, as is evident in state and federal statutory regimes. To date, the majority of states and the …
Copyright Complements And Piracy-Induced Deadweight Loss, Jiarui (Jerry) Liu
Copyright Complements And Piracy-Induced Deadweight Loss, Jiarui (Jerry) Liu
Indiana Law Journal
Conventional wisdom suggests that copyright piracy may in effect reduce the deadweight loss resulting from copyright protection because it allows the public unlimited access to information goods at a price closer to marginal cost. It has been further contended that lower copyright protection would benefit society as a whole, as long as authors continue to receive sufficient incentives from alternative revenue streams in ancillary markets, for example, touring, advertising, and merchandizing. By evaluating the empirical evidence from the music, performance, and video game markets, this Article highlights a counterintuitive yet important point: copyright piracy, while decreasing the deadweight loss in …