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Essays On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard In Insurance Market, Jian Wen
Essays On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard In Insurance Market, Jian Wen
Risk Management and Insurance Dissertations
Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse selection from moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to identify the signals of adverse selection and moral hazard generated by the actions of the primary insurer and to provide a basis for corresponding hypotheses for empirical testing. Using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and A.M. Best Company, the empirical tests show that the problem of adverse selection exists in the reinsurance market between the affiliated …
Reinsurance Contracting With Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard: Theory And Evidence, Zhiqiang Yan
Reinsurance Contracting With Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard: Theory And Evidence, Zhiqiang Yan
Risk Management and Insurance Dissertations
This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash equilibria. In the second essay, we use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance for the period 1995-2000 to test for the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard. We find that (1) adverse selection is present in private passenger auto liability reinsurance market and homeowners reinsurance market, but not in product liability reinsurance market; (2) residual moral hazard does not …