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Full-Text Articles in Business
Post-Crisis Financialization Through Product Innovation: Assessing Complexity, Growth & Design In Exchange Traded Funds, Ryan Clements
Post-Crisis Financialization Through Product Innovation: Assessing Complexity, Growth & Design In Exchange Traded Funds, Ryan Clements
Duke Law SJD Dissertations
This dissertation examines emerging risks and regulatory concerns in exchange traded funds (ETFs). It makes four core arguments through four published or accepted (and forthcoming) law review articles, alongside two published blog posts, all of which were written and previously submitted to the SJD Committee during the author’s dissertation research period. These articles are organized herein as dissertation chapters together with a contextual introduction and a summary conclusion which frames the dissertation within the scholarly literature on economic “financialization,” and emerging challenges associated with the growth of large interconnected asset managers.
The four core arguments in this dissertation are as …
Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations And Legal Efficacy, Steven L. Schwarcz
Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations And Legal Efficacy, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines how insights into limited human rationality can improve financial regulation. The Article identifies four categories of limitations—herd behavior, cognitive biases, overreliance on heuristics, and a proclivity to panic—that undermine the perfect-market regulatory assumptions that parties have full information and will act in their rational self-interest. The Article then analyzes how insights into these limitations can be used to correct resulting market failures. Requiring more robust disclosure and due diligence, for example, can help to reduce reliance on misleading information cascades that motivate herd behavior. Debiasing through law, such as requiring more specific, poignant, and concrete disclosure of …
Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz
Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.
Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, And Corporate Responsibility, Steven L. Schwarcz
Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, And Corporate Responsibility, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Domestic and international regulatory efforts to prevent another financial crisis have been converging on the idea of trying to end the problem of “too big to fail”—that systemically important financial firms take excessive risks because they profit from success and are (or at least, expect to be) bailed out by government money to avoid failure. The legal solutions being advanced to control this morally hazardous behavior tend, however, to be inefficient, ineffective, or even dangerous—such as breaking up firms and limiting their size, which can reduce economies of scale and scope; or restricting central bank authority to bail out failing …
Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance, Steven L. Schwarcz
Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Most of the regulatory measures to control excessive risk taking by systemically important firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and to align the interests of managers and investors. These measures may be flawed because they are based on questionable assumptions. Excessive corporate risk taking is, at its core, a corporate governance problem. Shareholder primacy requires managers to view the consequences of their firm’s risk taking only from the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders, ignoring harm to the public. In governing, managers of systemically important firms should also consider public harm. This proposal engages the long-standing debate whether …
Perspectives On Regulating Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Perspectives On Regulating Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This book chapter, which synthesizes several of the author’s articles, attempts to provide useful perspectives on regulating systemic risk. First, it argues that systemic shocks are inevitable. Accordingly, regulation should be designed not only to try to reduce those shocks but also to protect the financial system against their unavoidable impact. This could be done, the chapter explains, by applying chaos theory to help stabilize the financial system. The chapter then focuses on trying to prevent excessive corporate risk-taking, which is one of the leading triggers of systemic shocks and widely regarded to have been a principal cause of the …
Keynote Address, Regulating Corporate Governance In The Public Interest: The Case Of Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address, Regulating Corporate Governance In The Public Interest: The Case Of Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
There’s long been a debate whether corporate governance law should require some duty to the public. The accepted wisdom is not to require such a duty—that corporate profit maximization provides jobs and other public benefits that exceed any harm. This is especially true, the argument goes, because imposing specific regulatory requirements and making certain actions illegal or tortious can mitigate the harm without unduly impairing corporate wealth production. Whether that is true in other contexts, this paper—delivered as the keynote address at the June 2016 National Business Law Scholars Conference at The University of Chicago Law School—questions if it’s true …
Shadow Banking And Regulation In China And Other Developing Countries, Steven L. Schwarcz
Shadow Banking And Regulation In China And Other Developing Countries, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
The rapid but largely unregulated growth in shadow banking in developing countries such as China can jeopardize financial stability. This article discusses that growth and argues that a regulatory balance is needed to help protect financial stability while preserving shadow banking as an important channel of alternative funding. The article also analyzes how that regulation could be designed.
Corporate Risk-Taking And Public Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz
Corporate Risk-Taking And Public Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Geometric Information Of Yield Curve, Unspanned Stochastic Volatility, And Affine Heath-Jarrow-Morton Models, Qingbin Wang
Geometric Information Of Yield Curve, Unspanned Stochastic Volatility, And Affine Heath-Jarrow-Morton Models, Qingbin Wang
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
The differences between the daily routine of fitting the yield curve (or equivalently, the forward rate curve) and the dynamic
Psychological Correlates Of Investor Risk, John Laurin Vaughn
Psychological Correlates Of Investor Risk, John Laurin Vaughn
Theses Digitization Project
The present study explores the efficacy of a standardized psychological test known as Rotter's Internal/External Locus of Control Scale in predicting investor's level of risk aversion.
Improving The Quality And Quantity Of Commercial Loans For Today's Lenders, Jeffrey Scott Kowallis
Improving The Quality And Quantity Of Commercial Loans For Today's Lenders, Jeffrey Scott Kowallis
Theses Digitization Project
The purpose of this project is to create financial models and techniques that will streamline the loan process as well as improve the risk quality.
Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, And Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, And Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.