Business Commons^™

Disproportional Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Entrepreneurial Firm In China, Jerry X. Cao, Gary Gang Tian, Vincent Tang, Xiaoming Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance in China. Although entrepreneurial firms underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Entrepreneurial firms with one share one vote structure outperform those with ownership control wedge by 30% for 3 years post-IPO in either buy-and-hold or cumulative monthly returns. Entrepreneurial firms with excess ownership control wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that entrepreneurial firms need to improve corporate governance such as disproportional ownership structure to better safeguard …

Economic Effects Of Sox Section 404 Compliance: A Corporate Insider Perspective, Cindy Alexander, Scott Bauguess, Gennaro Bernile, Alex Lee, Jennifer Marietta-Westberg

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We use survey responses from 2,901 corporate insiders to assess the costs and benefits of compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The majority of respondents recognize compliance benefits, but they do not perceive these benefits to outweigh the costs, on average. This is particularly true among smaller companies where the start-up costs are proportionately larger. However, the perceived efficiency of compliance increases with auditor attestations, years of compliance experience, and after the remediation of a material weakness. Notably, the perceived effects of compliance depend largely on firm complexity, but are mostly unrelated to firm governance structure.

The Determinants And Consequences Of Ceo Cheap Stock In Ipos, Michael Dennis Stuart

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

The term "cheap stock" describes undervalued stock options granted to CEOs and other key employees prior to initial public offerings (IPOs). Pre-IPO firms have incentives to issue cheap stock as compensation because it results in lower compensation expense on the income statement and in large cash windfalls to CEOs subsequent to the IPO. Because cheap stock results in an overstatement of earnings, the Securities and Exchange Commission frequently challenges the valuations of these grants, which makes cheap stock a key accounting issue in many IPOs. Using a sample of firms that completed IPOs between 2004 and 2007, I investigate the …

Does Adopting Good Corporate Governance Enhance Accruals Quality During The Global Financial Crisis?, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan

Keith Duncan

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance practices on accruals quality during the global financial crisis (GFC). Prior research establishes linkages between good governance and accruals quality during periods of financial stability (Strydom 2008; Kent et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2010). We extend this analysis to the 2008-2009 GFC period to assess whether the monitoring and informational benefits of corporate governance mitigate the negative effects of the exogenous shock, thereby increasing accruals quality. Our findings show that good corporate governance practices increases accruals quality during the GFC. Furthermore, governance is shown to positively impact innate accruals quality and, …

Liquidity, Governance And Adverse Selection In Asset Pricing, Sascha Strobl

FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

A plethora of recent literature on asset pricing provides plenty of empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity, governance and adverse selection of equity on pricing of assets together with more traditional factors such as market beta and the Fama-French factors. However, literature has usually stressed that these factors are priced individually. In this dissertation we argue that these factors may be related to each other, hence not only individual but also joint tests of their significance is called for.

In the three related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context of the finer three-digit SIC industry classification, …

The Discretionary Effect Of Ceos And Board Chairs On Corporate Governance Structures, Matteo P. Arena, Marcus V. Braga-Alves

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance. We find that CEO and board chair fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in board size, board independence, and CEO-chair duality even after controlling for several firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. The effect of CEOs on corporate governance practices is attributable mainly to executives who simultaneously hold the position of CEO and board chair in the same firm. Our results do not show a decline in CEO discretionary influence on corporate governance after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and stock exchange …

Who Calls The Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote On Director Elections, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan

All Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corporate governance, and mutual funds control a substantial percentage of shareholder voting power. The manner in which mutual funds exercise that power, however, is poorly understood. In particular, because neither mutual funds nor their advisors are beneficial owners of their portfolio holdings, there is concern that mutual fund voting may be uninformed or tainted by conflicts of interest. These concerns, if true, hamper the potential effectiveness of regulatory reforms such as proxy access and say on pay. This article analyzes mutual fund voting decisions in uncontested director elections. We find that …

Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

This article addresses the question whether (and how) the shareholders matter for social welfare. Answers to the question have changed over time. Observers in the mid-twentieth century believed that the socio-economic characteristics of real world shareholders were highly pertinent to social welfare inquiries. But they went on to conclude that there followed no justification for catering to shareholder interest, for shareholders occupied elite social strata. The answer changed during the twentieth century’s closing decades, when observers came to accord the shareholder interest a key structural role in the enhancement of economic efficiency even as they also deemed irrelevant the characteristics …

The Impact Of Ceo Duality On Firm Financial And Market Performance During The Period Of 2008 Through 2010 : A Period Of Financial Crisis, Samuel Eugene Ferrara

Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)

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