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Full-Text Articles in Business
"Flaw-Backs:" Executive Compensation Clawbacks And Their Costly Flaw, Connor Douglas Maag
"Flaw-Backs:" Executive Compensation Clawbacks And Their Costly Flaw, Connor Douglas Maag
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
Saving money should not be expensive. Compensation “clawbacks” are a legal mechanism for companies to reclaim employee compensation, but the legislative framework is complex and disorganized. There are four primary federal claw-back provisions: Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(TARP), and Dodd-Frank § 956—as well as voluntary contractual clawback policies. This comment untangles the web of clawback legislation by overlaying each clawback mechanism to extract a single, clear, and concise description of executive compensation clawbacks, called the “Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.” The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in the legal and regulatory framework: clawbacks increase agency …
Choosing The Precision Of Performance Metrics, Alan D. Crane, Andrew Koch, Chi Shen Wei
Choosing The Precision Of Performance Metrics, Alan D. Crane, Andrew Koch, Chi Shen Wei
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
There is a standard trade-off in contracts between the provision of incentives and insurance. We hypothesize that this trade-off influences the precision with which firm performance is measured. We find that firm outcomes are measured less precisely when chance plays a large role in these outcomes. Further, this precision is determined through the choice of shares outstanding. This has several novel implications. Nominal stock prices can remain constant over time, and firms with unpredictable cash flows should have more shares and lower stock price levels, all else equal. We find evidence consistent with these implications.
The Propensity To Split And Ceo Compensation, Erik Devos, William B. Elliott, Richard S. Warr
The Propensity To Split And Ceo Compensation, Erik Devos, William B. Elliott, Richard S. Warr
2018 Faculty Bibliography
We analyze the relation between the delta and vega of a chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation and the propensity of the firm to engage in a split. Controlling for other well-known factors, we find that CEOs with compensation that has higher levels of delta are more likely to split their shares. Furthermore, the choice of split factor is inversely related to delta. Our results are economically significant: for the average (median) firm in our sample, a stock split results in a CEO wealth gain of $4.9 million ($84,000).