Business Commons^™

Designated Directors In The Boardroom: Their Impact On Governance And Performance And Shareholder Wealth Effects, Laura Seery Cole

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation examines the appointment of designated directors on boards of directors. Designated director appointments are uncontested board appointments by activist investors, whereby normal nominating and voting election procedures are circumvented. Instances such as these, where directors are appointed rather than elected, are a form of shareholder access to the proxy. In this dissertation, new evidence is provided that is relevant to the proxy access debate by investigating the hypothesis that firms with appointed designated directors have different firm and governance characteristics than firms with elected directors. In particular, the following questions are asked: what are the shareholder wealth effects …

Exploring The Effectiveness Of Environmentally Sustainable Practices In Municipal Government: A Case Study Of The City Of Knoxville’S Department Of Parks And Recreation, Anthony Michael Brown

Masters Theses

Sustainability practices produce programs and services that meet current needs while preserving the environment and natural resources for the future. City parks and recreation departments are facing budget shortfalls and increasing expectations from customers. Governments are now embracing sustainability practices to create financial savings while also fostering relations with customers.

The purpose of this single case study was twofold: (1) to examine the effectiveness of one city department’s strategies in outsourcing its environmental sustainability program through a performance contract with Ameresco; and (2) to examine the perceptions of key department employees about the effectiveness of the sustainability initiative. A …

Ceo Serps: Are They Related To Firm Risk And Who Approves Them?, Colin D. Reid

Doctoral Dissertations

This paper investigates whether CEO supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) are associated with firm risk. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) show that CEOs manage their firms more conservatively as their debt incentives increase. Using new executive compensation disclosures mandated by the SEC, I find a negative association between CEO SERPs and firm risk but only for unsheltered SERPs. I find that when a CEO SERP is protected by a lump sum payment or by a trust (i.e. sheltered), the negative association between SERPs and firm risk is greatly diminished and even eliminated in some models. Furthermore, I show that having a …