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Full-Text Articles in Business
Executive Compensation And The Maturity Structure Of Corporate Debt, Paul Brockman, Xiumin Martin, Emre Unlu
Executive Compensation And The Maturity Structure Of Corporate Debt, Paul Brockman, Xiumin Martin, Emre Unlu
Department of Finance: Faculty Publications
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. We also find that shortmaturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and delta-related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.
Dividend Policy, Creditor Rights, And The Agency Costs Of Debt, Paul Brockman, Emre Unlu
Dividend Policy, Creditor Rights, And The Agency Costs Of Debt, Paul Brockman, Emre Unlu
Department of Finance: Faculty Publications
We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm’s agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction …