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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Business
Not All Customers Are Created Equal: Looking At Lifetime Value, Mark E. Pickering
Not All Customers Are Created Equal: Looking At Lifetime Value, Mark E. Pickering
Mark E Pickering
Customer Lifetime Value (CLV) refines customer profitability analysis to view customers as assets. Thinking in terms of CLV provides the impetus to target customer acquisition efforts on the right customers, and to improve the profitability and duration of the relationship with existing customers. This article introduces the concepts and benefits associated with CLV and actions to improve value.
Using Customer Profitability Information To Drive The Bottom Line, Mark E. Pickering
Using Customer Profitability Information To Drive The Bottom Line, Mark E. Pickering
Mark E Pickering
This article utilises a case study of a textile manufacturer and distributor to demonstrate the use of customer profitability analysis to improve company profitability.
Poison Pills, Optimal Contracting, And The Market For Corporate Control: Evidence From Fortune 500 Firms, Atreya Chakraborty
Poison Pills, Optimal Contracting, And The Market For Corporate Control: Evidence From Fortune 500 Firms, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
The rationale for issuing poison pill securities remains unclear, despite the findings of a large body of prior research that these defenses adversely affect shareholder wealth. This paper investigates the hypothesis that the adoption of such defenses may reflect shareholders’ desire to contract efficiently with their managers in an environment characterized by hostile takeovers and uncertainty about the managers’ true performance. Unlike previous research, we focus on financial characteristics of firms as they relate to the motives for adopting such defenses. Our empirical research does not support the optimal contacting hypothesis. We interpret our results as supportive of the managerial …
Dynamic Futures Hedging In Currency Markets, Atreya Chakraborty
Dynamic Futures Hedging In Currency Markets, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
The hedging effectiveness of dynamic strategies is compared with static (traditional) ones using futures contracts for the leading five currencies. The traditional hedging model assumes time invariance in the joint distribution of spot and futures price changes thus leading to a constant optimal hedge ratio (OHR). However, if this timeinvariance assumption is violated, time-varying OHRs are appropriate for hedging purposes. A bivariate GARCH model is employed to estimate the joint distribution of spot and futures currency returns and the sequence of dynamic (time-varying) OHRs is constructed based upon the estimated parameters of the conditional covariance matrix. The empirical evidence strongly …
Positively Influencing Physicians: The Levers Of Influence, William Marty Martin
Positively Influencing Physicians: The Levers Of Influence, William Marty Martin
William Marty Martin
No abstract provided.
Uncertainty In Executive Compensation And Capital Investment: A Panel Study, Atreya Chakraborty
Uncertainty In Executive Compensation And Capital Investment: A Panel Study, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
We investigate whether uncertainty in CEO compensation influences the firm's investment decisions. We use panel data on compensation to estimate CEO income uncertainty and cross-sectional investment data to measure capital investment. Given the prospect of bearing extra risk, a rational agent reacts to minimize the impact of such risk. We provide evidence that CEOs with high earnings uncertainty invest less. We find that the negative impact of permanent earnings uncertainty on firm investment is larger than that of transitory earnings uncertainty. Our results are robust to several alternate specifications and can be helpful in building compensation packages that lead to …