Business Commons^™

2017 Costliest Year Ever For Weather-Related Disasters, Betsy Hnath

News Items

No abstract provided.

Random Walks And Market Efficiency: Evidence From Real Estate Investment Trusts (Reit) Subsectors, Fahad Almudhaf, Andrew J. Hansz

Finance Faculty Publications

This paper investigates the random walk behavior of real estate investment trust (REIT) subsectors using monthly return data from January 1994 to July 2015. Using variance ratio tests, we examine subsectors of lodging/ resorts and self-storage and find that they do not follow a random walk, contradicting the weak-form efficient market hypothesis. Nonparametric runs tests help us find that office, industrial, mixed, free standing, shopping centers, apartments, manufactured homes, and timberland subsectors are weak-form efficient. The evidence in this study supports the idea that some subsectors are more informationally efficient than other subsectors. Copyright © 2018 The Author(s).

Does The Market Believe White Knights And Hostile Bidders Are Acting In Their Shareholders' Interest?, John M. Griffith, Mohammad Najand, Jiancheng Shen

Finance Faculty Publications

This study examines why white knights suffer significant losses while their rival hostile bidders experience significant abnormal gains. We address two research questions: 1) Does the market believe that white knights and hostile bidders are acting in their shareholders' interest? 2) Does Tobin's q explain why white knights suffer significant losses and hostile bidders experience significant gains upon the announcement of their bids? The results show that hostile bidders are value-maximizing investors and white knights are not acting in their shareholders' interest. Instead, white knights suffered significant reductions in value and historically have not maximized the wealth of investors

Three Essays On Ceo Risk Preferences, And Ability, Corporate Hedging Decisions, And Investor Sentiment, Sonik Mandal

Finance Theses & Dissertations

The derivative hedging research has looked at why firms and how firms hedge and if it increases value for their shareholders. In this dissertation we investigate the relation between CEO risk preferences and ability and whether if affects their hedging decisions and firm value.

In our first essay, we challenge the theory and previous empirical evidence that showed CEO risk preferences affects hedging. Using a sample of Fortune 500 firms and 5 years of panel data, and using inside debt (i.e., CEO pension and deferred compensation) and the CEO Vega and CEO Delta, as proxies of CEO risk preferences, we …