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Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams
Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams
Peter Cramton
Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values …
The Efficiency Of The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
The Efficiency Of The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising about $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions efficient? Did they award the licenses to the firms best able to turn the spectrum into valuable services for consumers? There is substantial evidence that the FCC's simultaneous ascending auction worked well. It raised large revenues. It revealed critical information in the process of bidding and gave bidders the flexibility to adjust strategies in response to new information. As a result, similar licenses sold …
Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams
Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams
Peter Cramton
Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values …
Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton
Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowing efficient aggregations of items. Alternatively, the information may be used by bidders to establish and enforce collusive outcomes. Ex ante asymmetries and weak competition favor a sealed-bid design. In other cases, an ascending auction is likely to perform …
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Package Bidding, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Package Bidding, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of licenses), and the computational complexity problem (which arises from the fact that the number of possible combinations of licenses is much larger than the number of licenses). Package bidding offers the possibility of an improvement over individual-license bidding only when there are strong complementarities and the pattern of those complementarities varies across bidders. Package bidding works satisfactorily …