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Full-Text Articles in Business
A Cross-Sectional Analysis Of The Determinants Of Corporate Share Repurchases, Kenneth M. Washer
A Cross-Sectional Analysis Of The Determinants Of Corporate Share Repurchases, Kenneth M. Washer
Doctoral Dissertations
The objective of this study is to determine which motives play a significant role in determining the extent of a firm's repurchasing activity. For firms repurchasing through the open market, the motives include taking advantage of perceived undervaluation, increasing financial leverage, distributing cash to shareholders, and reducing agency costs. For firms using a tender offer, the motives include taking advantage of perceived undervaluation and having the ability to significantly increase financial leverage. Also, the hypothesis that the perceived undervaluation motive is stronger for smaller firms is tested. Three censored regression models are employed, and each model's explanatory variables represent commonly …
Auctioning Securities, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Auctioning Securities, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction (Ausubel 1996) have important theoretical advantages for sellers. In a setting without private information, these auctions achieve the maximal revenue as a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies. In contrast, the pay-your-bid, uniform-price, and standard ascending-bid auction admit a multiplicity of equilibria that yield low revenues for the seller. We show how these results extend to a setting where …
Auctions And Takeovers, Peter Cramton
Auctions And Takeovers, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Under Delaware law (the predominant corporate law in the US), when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's board of directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company." (Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 173). The target's board may not use defensive tactics that destroy the auction process and must attempt to seek higher bids. Similarly, the Williams Act requires takeover bids to remain open for at least 20 business days on the grounds that the delay facilitates auctions. This preference …