Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Business
Institutions Matter: Why The Herder Problem Is Not A Prisoner's Dilemma, Daniel H. C., Peter Z. Grossman
Institutions Matter: Why The Herder Problem Is Not A Prisoner's Dilemma, Daniel H. C., Peter Z. Grossman
Scholarship and Professional Work - Business
In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma are absent in the Herder Problem. Their absence does not ensure that players will achieve a welfare-enhancing, cooperative solution to the …
The Meaning Of Property Rights: Law Versus Economics? , Daniel H. Cole, Peter Z. Grossman
The Meaning Of Property Rights: Law Versus Economics? , Daniel H. Cole, Peter Z. Grossman
Scholarship and Professional Work - Business
Property rights are fundamentals to economic analysis. There is, however, no consensus in the economic literature about what property rights are. Economists define them variously and inconsistently, sometimes in ways that deviate from the conventional understandings of legal scholars and judges. This article explores ways in which definitions of property rights in the economic literature diverge from conventional legal understandings, and how those divergences can create interdisciplinary confusion and bias economic analyses. Indeed, some economists' idiosyncratic definitions of property rights, if used to guide policy, could lead to suboptimal economic outcomes.
Domestic Monopoly, Quotas & Contestable Rents, William Rieber
Domestic Monopoly, Quotas & Contestable Rents, William Rieber
Scholarship and Professional Work - Business
In this article, a specific example is given to illustrate that rent seeking can raise welfare under full seeking in general equilibrium: an import quota is levied in the presence of domestic monopoly in the import competing industry. An import quota is considered instead of an import tariff since a tariff confers no market power on the local monopolist. The monopolist still faces a perfectly elastic demand, corresponding now to the world price plus tariff. The introduction of monopoly does not add another distortion to the economy, which is necessary if full rent seeking is to be welfare improving. But …