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Full-Text Articles in Business
Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …
Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled with a financial option to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating resources and prices capacity from the bids of competitive new entry in an annual auction. Efficient performance incentives are maintained from a load-following obligation to supply energy above the strike price. The capacity payment fully hedges load from high spot prices, and reduces supplier risk as well. Market power is reduced in the spot market, since suppliers enter the spot market with a nearly …
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
Peter Cramton
This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of incumbents. This paper also estimates what prices would have been in the open auction had incumbents been excluded from bidding in the closed. It is found that an incumbent’s participation in the closed auction through a front, Alaska Native, enabled it to win more licenses at lower prices in FCC Auction 35. In contrast, non-incumbents won fewer …
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications Symposium – Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“the Division”). Our focus is on the state of competition in the wireless sector. Maintaining a competitive wireless sector is particularly critical if, as the Division’s agenda indicates, wireless services are to function as a competitive alternative to wireline technologies. Strengthening competition is especially important now after recent mergers that consolidated the wireless industry into a few dominant firms (two to four depending on …
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.
Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
A common misconception is that an open access provision on a sliver of the 700 MHz spectrum would reduce auction revenues. In fact, the open access, wholesale, and bidding credit provisions put forth by Frontline Wireless, will motivate new entry, enhance competition in the auction, and raise revenues.
Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the open access plan. We disagree with these criticisms and argue that given the current market structure, such rules are likely to improve welfare and auction revenues. We are submitting this report to provide sound economic analysis of these claims.
Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
We comment on the service and auction rules discussed in the Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 07-72, 27 April 2007. We recommend that the FCC designate one license for a wholesale operation that provides open access nationwide on nondiscriminatory terms. This is necessary to enable entry of new businesses offering wireless services in retail markets. It also enables local operators to offer roaming at competitive prices. The new license accords with the Commission’s policy to encourage competition, and recognizes the benefits to consumers from low prices and expanded services.
How Best To Auction Oil Rights, Peter Cramton
How Best To Auction Oil Rights, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I study the design of oil rights auctions. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take by reducing oil company risk.
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.
Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton
Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowing efficient aggregations of items. Alternatively, the information may be used by bidders to establish and enforce collusive outcomes. Ex ante asymmetries and weak competition favor a sealed-bid design. In other cases, an ascending auction is likely to perform …
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Peter Cramton
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection results in either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome. However, if the cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by the member firms, then the incentive problem can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.