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Full-Text Articles in Business
Generalist Ceos And Audit Pricing, Zhiming Ma, Rencheng Wang, Kaitang Zhou
Generalist Ceos And Audit Pricing, Zhiming Ma, Rencheng Wang, Kaitang Zhou
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We analyze the consequences of a firm hiring a generalist CEO in terms of the audit fees paid by the firm. We find that audit fees of clients with generalist CEOs are higher than those of clients with specialist CEOs. This relation is robust to considering managerial ability, other CEO characteristics, various fixed effects, instrumental variables, and change analyses. We further show that fee differences are larger for firms with weaker monitoring and higher corporate litigation risks. Through path analysis, we find that both client business risk and misreporting risk contribute to the fee difference. Finally, we find that auditors …
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.
The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, And The Asymmetrical Behavior Of Selling, General, And Administrative Costs, Hai Lu, Hai Lu, Theodore Sougiannis
The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, And The Asymmetrical Behavior Of Selling, General, And Administrative Costs, Hai Lu, Hai Lu, Theodore Sougiannis
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs represent a significant proportion of thecosts of business operations. On average, the SG&A costs to total assets ratio is 27 percent,compared to the research and development (R&D) to total assets ratio of 3 percent(Banker, Huang, and Natarajan 2011). Due to the importance of SG&A costs, practitionerspay close attention to controlling SG&A spending. Understanding SG&A cost behaviorand the role of managers in adjusting the costs is thus important to researchers andpractitioners. Recent empirical research indicates that SG&A costs behave asymmetrically,that is, they increase more rapidly when demand increases than they decline when demanddecreases (Anderson, Banker, …
Determinants Of Corporate Cash Holdings, Yun Lai (William) Li
Determinants Of Corporate Cash Holdings, Yun Lai (William) Li
CMC Senior Theses
The paper explores the driving forces behind corporate cash holdings by analyzing past literature and extending this research to the behavior of firms after the 2008 recession. I look at the cash to assets and net debt to assets ratios from October 1980 to October 2011 to obtain an understanding of the past and current state of cash holdings. A comprehensive literature review is done on agency costs and transactional motives to give the reader an overview of the costs and benefits of holding cash. This provides the foundation for the precautionary motives for companies today to keep cash as …